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CONSUMERS, SELLER-ADVISORS, AND 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TRUST 
JUSTIN SEVIER* 
KELLI ALCES WILLIAMS** 
Abstract: Every day, consumers ask sellers for advice. Because they do not or 
cannot know better, consumers rely on that advice in making financial deci-
sions of varying significance. Sellers, motivated by strong and often conflict-
ing self-interests, are well-positioned to lead consumers to make decisions that 
are profitable for sellers and may be harmful to the consumers themselves. 
Short of imposing fraud liability in extreme situations, the law neither protects 
the trust consumers place in “seller-advisors,” nor alerts them to the incentives 
motivating the advice that sellers give. This Article makes several contribu-
tions to the literature. First, it identifies and defines the seller-advisor. Sellers 
and advisors are usually regarded separately by the law; therefore, consumers 
interacting with them are protected by different rules. As a result, a false di-
chotomy has arisen between (1) a doctrine of caveat emptor, subject to liabil-
ity for fraud and applying to consumers interacting with sellers, and (2) fidu-
ciary duties protecting consumers interacting with advisors. This Article is the 
first attempt to study consumer trust in the many common transactions that 
fall somewhere in the space between. Second, in reporting the results of an 
original psychology experiment, this Article offers empirical evidence of how 
consumers’ decision making is influenced by the trust they place in seller-
advisors. Finally, it explores how consumer trust in seller-advisors arises and 
how it can be manipulated in an effort to understand how legal policy should 
respond to both the ubiquity of seller-advisors and the consequences of con-
sumer reliance on, and vulnerability to, their advice. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Trust (n): reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety, etc., of a 
person or thing; confidence.”1 
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When University of Central Arkansas history professor Kim Little 
(“Little”) noticed an unusual growth below her eye in 2012, she made a rou-
tine appointment to see her primary care physician.2 After examining the 
skin on her right cheek, the primary care physician assured Little that it was 
a blemish that would disappear within a few days.3 In an unrelated ap-
pointment with a local dermatologist, however, an alert physician assistant 
noticed the white bump and, after running additional tests, determined that 
the growth was a cancerous basal cell carcinoma.4 
Although basal cell carcinoma is the least dangerous form of skin can-
cer, the doctors informed Little that the growth should be removed.5 She was 
faced with two choices for removing the malignant lesion: (1) the traditional 
procedure for removing the growth either by incision or by freezing the le-
sion; or (2) the more innovative and (unbeknownst to Little) vastly more ex-
pensive “Mohs technique” procedure, which typically removes less skin tis-
sue when removing the growth.6 When Little asked her dermatologist for his 
recommendation, he insisted on using the Mohs technique, which he would 
perform.7 When Little expressed doubt that the Mohs technique was neces-
sary, the dermatologist stated that it was the only procedure available because 
of the proximity of the lesion to Little’s eye.8 The dermatologist assured Little 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Trust, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/trust [https://perma.cc/9G8L-
KZRQ]. Other dictionaries define trust as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or 
truth of someone or something,” or “a charge or duty imposed in faith or confidence or as a condi-
tion of some relationship.” E.g., Trust, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/trust [https://perma.cc/2HS4-FZ3C]. 
 2 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Patients’ Costs Skyrocket; Specialists’ Incomes Soar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
18, 2014), https://www nytimes.com/2014/01/19/health/patients-costs-skyrocket-specialists-incomes-
soar html [https://perma.cc/8Y8H-D4MJ]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. A basal cell carcinoma (“BCC”) is an “uncontrolled growth[] or lesion[] that arise[s] in 
the skin’s basal cells, which line the deepest layer of the epidermis (the outermost layer of the 
skin).” Basal Cell Carcinoma (BCC), SKIN CANCER FOUND., http://www.skincancer.org/skin-
cancer-information/basal-cell-carcinoma [https://perma.cc/K6FV-3ZUU]. BCC is typically caused 
by overexposure to the sun and can take the form of “open sores, red patches, pink growths, shiny 
bumps, or scars.” Id. 
 5 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 6 Id. The Mayo Clinic defines the Mohs technique (also called Mohs micrographic surgery) as 
“a precise surgical technique used to treat skin cancer.” Mohs Surgery, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.
mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/mohs-surgery/basics/definition/prc-20014261 [https://perma.cc/
FVC6-2JAE]. During the surgery, “thin layers of cancer-containing skin are progressively re-
moved and examined until only cancer-free tissue remains.” Id. The Mayo Clinic further clarifies: 
“The goal of Mohs surgery is to remove as much of the skin cancer as possible, while doing min-
imal damage to surrounding healthy tissue. Mohs surgery is usually done on an outpatient basis 
using a local anesthetic.” Id. 
 7 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 8 Id. There was apparently a dispute between Little and her dermatologist regarding whether 
the BCC was located on her eye or cheek. Id. 
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that the outpatient surgery would be minor, and that she would leave with just 
“a couple of stitches” when the procedure was complete.9 
Little reluctantly agreed to the dermatologist’s recommendation.10 A 
few weeks later, Little traveled thirty miles to Little Rock, Arkansas, where 
the dermatologist performed the thirty-minute procedure.11 He declined, 
however, to sew up the area on her cheek.12 Instead, he directed her to a 
plastic surgeon located across the street.13 When Little protested again, stat-
ing that she did not need a plastic surgeon and that she was unconcerned 
about having a small scar on her cheek, her dermatologist informed her that 
she had no choice.14 He assured her, however, that the plastic surgeon’s 
work would be quick and minimally invasive.15 
When Little crossed the street to the plastic surgeon’s office, she was 
greeted by several nurses who took her clothes and inserted an IV into her 
arm, as well as an anesthesiologist who was waiting to sedate her for the 
procedure in the oculoplastic surgery center’s operating room.16 She left the 
operating room with over two dozen stitches and was sick for several days 
from the IV fluids used during the unwanted procedure.17 
When the bill arrived for her relatively minor medical issue, Little was 
furious.18 Because the Mohs technique involved three different highly-paid 
specialists—a dermatologist, an anesthesiologist, and an ophthalmologist 
trained in plastic surgery—and was performed on the grounds of a large 
hospital instead of at an outpatient clinic, Little was charged over $26,000 
for what was essentially minor surgery.19 She was charged nearly $2,000 for 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. This appears to be an unusual protocol on the part of the dermatologist. See The Mohs 
Procedure, AM. COLL. MOHS SURGERY, https://www.skincancermohssurgery.org/about-mohs-
surgery/the-mohs-procedure [https://perma.cc/4JMK-Z386]. The American College of Mohs Sur-
gery website specifies: “When . . . surgery is complete, [the] Mohs surgeon assesses the wound 
and discusses [the patient’s] options for ideal functional and cosmetic reconstruction. . . . If recon-
struction is necessary, the Mohs surgeon usually repairs the area the same day as the tumor re-
moval.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 14 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. This also appears to be a deviation from the typical procedure for Mohs surgery. See 
The Mohs Procedure, supra note 13 (“[Patients] receive local anesthesia around the area of the 
tumor, so [patients] are awake during the entire procedure. The use of local anesthesia versus 
general anesthesia provides numerous benefits, including preventing a lengthy recovery and pos-
sible side effects from general anesthesia.”) (emphasis added). 
 17 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. BCC is the most common form of skin cancer, but it is also the least serious form (and 
the form that generally responds best to minimally-invasive treatment) according to physicians. 
See BCC, supra note 4 ( “BCC almost never spreads (metastasizes) beyond the original tumor site. 
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the Mohs technique itself, nearly $15,000 for the plastic surgeon to sew up 
the wound, $1,000 for the anesthesiologist, and nearly $9,000 for the use of 
the hospital’s facilities.20 
At the time of her scheduled follow-up examination, Little opted not to 
return to the dermatologist who performed her procedure.21 She instead visit-
ed a physician at the University of Arkansas Medical Center. The physician 
suggested that she had been over-treated and that a less extensive, cheaper 
process would have been equally effective.22 Little, still furious at what she 
viewed as a breach of trust by her dermatologist, later told the New York 
Times, “I have an IV in my arm and a hole in my face that [the dermatologist] 
refused to stitch. And the anesthesiologist is standing there with his mask 
on.”23 She further noted that the dermatologist’s incision “was no bigger than 
many cuts that heal on their own, and it definitely could have been repaired 
by one doctor, but at that point what was I going to do?”24 
The dermatologist who treated Little is an example of a “seller-
advisor.” This Article defines seller-advisors as hybrid actors in commercial 
transactions who (1) give advice to consumers, (2) often have an undis-
closed financial incentive to make certain recommendations to the consum-
er, and (3) fall generally outside the scope of fiduciary duty laws which re-
quire a person in a relationship of trust and confidence with another to act 
solely in that other person’s best interest.25 
Seller-advisors are everywhere. Any time a consumer is interested in a 
product about which she is not an expert, she may rely on sellers of that 
product for advice about whether that product is appropriate for her, what 
model would fit the consumer’s needs best, and how to use the product to 
                                                                                                                           
Only in exceedingly rare cases can it spread to other parts of the body and become life-
threatening.”). 
 20 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. Medicare currently views the Mohs procedure as “potentially misvalued” insofar as the 
procedure is potentially overused and overpriced. See id.; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GUIDANCE TO REDUCE MOHS SURGERY REIM-
BURSEMENT ISSUES (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/SE1318.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB64-TF4Q] (provid-
ing guidance to reduce reimbursement issues for Mohs Surgery). After extensive negotiations span-
ning several months, Little reduced the charges for her surgery to almost $3,000. Rosenthal, supra 
note 2. She described this outcome as follows: “It was like, ‘Take out your purse, we’re robbing 
you.’” Id. 
 23 Rosenthal, supra note 2. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a fiduciary as 
“[s]omeone who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope 
of their relationship”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1289, 1293 (2011) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (describing “Components of Fiduci-
ary Relationships”). 
936 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:931 
the consumer’s advantage. Many daily transactions ranging widely in sig-
nificance and complexity involve an interaction between a consumer and a 
seller-advisor. Because of the sensitive nature of the transaction with the 
seller-advisor—and because of the opaque nature of the seller-advisor’s 
independent financial incentive—a problematic mismatch can develop be-
tween the expectations of the consumer and the behavior of the seller-
advisor: the consumer may mistakenly believe that her expectations of trust 
and confidence with a seller-advisor are legally protected or even practical-
ly justified, and may be unaware that the seller-advisor has no legal duty to 
act in her best interest.26 This mismatch has myriad implications for the 
ways lawmakers think about fiduciary duty law in the commercial context, 
the role of consumer protection laws with respect to transactions involving 
seller-advisors, and the ways in which consumers can be taught, irrespective 
of changes to existing law or policy, to temper their trust in the seller-
advisor by employing a healthy dose of skepticism. 
To that end, this Article reports the results from an original psychology 
experiment that we conducted, which examines consumer attitudes toward 
seller-advisors in a variety of commonplace financial transactions. In the 
experiment—which we report in two parts—we manipulated the nature of 
the financial transaction to which consumers were exposed, the stakes of the 
transaction, the presence or absence of a seller-advisor, and the obviousness 
of the seller-advisor’s financial incentive for making certain recommenda-
tions to consumers.27 
Our experiment revealed several important conclusions that should in-
terest legal policymakers. First, consumers imbue seller-advisors—even 
seller-advisors who are stereotypically viewed as having an obvious finan-
cial self-interest, such as car salespeople—with a significant degree of trust 
and confidence, regardless of the nature of the financial transaction.28 Sec-
ond, although high stakes transactions tend to make consumers more con-
servative (and less trusting of seller-advisors), we found a much stronger 
influence from the seller-advisor on consumers’ financial decisions.29 In 
other words, the mere presence of a seller-advisor caused consumers in our 
study to more often choose the option that was more financially risky and 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text.  
 27 See infra notes 176–184, 227–230 and accompanying text.  
 28 See infra notes 209–223 and accompanying text; see also Brad Tuttle, Car Shoppers’ Deci-
sions Most Influenced by . . . Person Trying to Sell Them Cars?, TIME (June 5, 2012), http://
business.time.com/2012/06/05/car-shoppers-decisions-most-influenced-by-person-trying-to-sell-
them-cars/ [https://perma.cc/4L47-2J6N] (describing the results of a survey finding that car buyers 
are most influenced by the advice of a salesperson, despite the salesperson’s “obvious self-interest 
in how that decision plays out”). 
 29 See infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text. 
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which conferred a greater financial benefit on the seller-advisor.30 Finally, 
through a series of statistical tests, we attribute this “mere presence” effect 
of the seller-advisor on consumers’ financial choices explicitly to the trust 
and confidence that consumers conferred onto the seller-advisor.31 
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it iden-
tifies and defines the seller-advisor. Sellers and advisors are usually regard-
ed separately by the law, and consumers interacting with them are protected 
by different rules.32 As a result of the false dichotomy between sellers and 
advisors, neither the doctrine of caveat emptor nor fiduciary duties fully 
protect consumers interacting with seller-advisors.33 This Article is the first 
attempt to study the many common transactions that fall somewhere in the 
space between. Second, in reporting the results of an original psychology 
experiment, this Article offers empirical evidence of how consumers’ deci-
sion making is influenced by the trust they place in seller-advisors. Finally, 
it explores how consumer trust in seller-advisors arises and how it can be 
manipulated in an effort to understand how legal policy should respond to 
both the ubiquity of seller-advisors and the consequences of consumer reli-
ance on, and vulnerability to, their advice. 
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I outlines the manner in 
which the law incorporates psychological and philosophical theories of 
trust—for example, through the common law of fiduciary duty and fraud, 
and through legislative enactments including consumer protection laws—
and explains how seller-advisors slip through the cracks of these judicial 
and legislative protections.34 Part II outlines the philosophical and psycho-
logical research on trust, and explains how consumers may view seller-
advisors in light of this research.35 Parts III and IV test our assertions in an 
original experiment, which we report in detail.36 Part V explores the impli-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 216–218 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 100–129 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 50–99 and accompanying text; see also Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies and 
the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 884 (2005) (“The displacement of caveat emptor by 
fairness-based justifications for a duty to disclose is perhaps most readily observed in the law 
governing confidential relationships—relationships in which the parties, by definition, operate 
closer than at arm’s-length.”); Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, Commercial Real Estate Buyer Be-
ware: Sellers May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1582 (1997) (con-
trasting relationships in which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies with fiduciary relationships 
where “the law imposes duties of honesty and full disclosure among . . . parties in accordance with 
the nature of the relationship and the parties’ expectations”). 
 34 See infra notes 38–129 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 130–166 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 167–245 and accompanying text. 
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cations of these findings, their limitations, and future directions for con-
sumer and business law.37 
I. THE LAW PROMOTING TRUST 
Trust is widely believed to be necessary for most social interactions, in-
cluding those that take place on various non-social markets.38 Trust is an im-
portant component of non-simultaneous exchanges, for example, and wide-
spread distrust would undermine market participation and may drive even 
trustworthy market participants out of business.39 Consumers must make de-
cisions about how and whether to proceed with an exchange quickly, and of-
ten have very little information to guide their choices.40 These exchange 
transactions that might seem to implicate trust the most must be conducted 
when the consumer lacks sufficient information to determine whether her ex-
change partner is trustworthy.41 It might take years to develop enough infor-
mation about a particular merchant to feel confident about trusting that sell-
er.42 Decisions to distrust sellers are also often made quickly, but may not be 
more accurate.43 
Policymakers have endeavored to protect consumers and sellers from 
the risks each face, such that the other will behave opportunistically. Typical 
buyer-seller relationships are governed by laws prohibiting fraud and con-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 246–291 and accompanying text. 
 38 See INT’L FED’N INFO. PROCESSING, Trust Management V, IFIP AICT 358 (Ian Wakeman 
et al. eds., 2011) (citing Toshio Yamagishi’s Keynote Speech, Trust and Social Intelligence, at the 
2011 IFIP Conference in Copenhagen); J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social 
Reality, 63 SOC. FORCES 967, 969 (1985). Some would argue that social interactions and networks 
also constitute markets with personal and emotional exchanges of utility driving incentives. See 
Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 989, 989 (1995) (“The final legitimation of the union [between economic theory 
and family law] came in 1992, when Professor Gary S. Becker of the University of Chicago was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for his work applying microeconomic theory to social problems, includ-
ing various aspects of family life.” (citing GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991)). 
 39 See RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST 20–23 (2006) (illustrating an “exchange model of trust” 
using game theory); Giangiacomo Bravo & Lucia Tamburino, The Evolution of Trust in Non-
Simultaneous Exchange Situations, 20 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 85, 85 (2008) (defining “non-
simultaneous exchanges” as those where “a subject bears a cost in order to provide a benefit to a 
different subject, who subsequently may or may not reciprocate”). 
 40 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) (“[M]any people make decisions with scant 
information and slight deliberation.”); Oswald A. Mascarenhas et al., Buyer-Seller Information 
Asymmetry: Challenges to Distributive and Corrective Justice, 28 J. MACROMARKETING 68, 68 
(2008) (discussing the relative lack of information available to consumers compared to sellers). 
 41 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 10; HARDIN, supra note 39, at 23. 
 42 See HARDIN, supra note 39, at 23 (comparing the difficulty of winning trust with the ease 
of losing trust). 
 43 Id. 
2018] Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of Trust 939 
sumer protection regulations prohibiting deceptive practices.44 In some situ-
ations, where one party is vulnerable to the other’s judgment or advice, the 
law imposes fiduciary duties that prohibit conflicted interests on the part of 
the more sophisticated actor.45 But there are circumstances where a truly 
unsophisticated buyer or investor must engage in a transaction with and 
seek advice from a seller with whom they deal at arm’s length, and who 
does not owe them fiduciary duties.46 In such circumstances, a buyer is 
seeking advice from the very party whose interests are adverse to their own 
without seeking advice from any independent third parties. We refer to 
sellers in these situations as seller-advisors. 
Seller-advisors do not owe fiduciary duties to consumers and, as they 
are only giving their opinion about what may be best for the buyer, are not 
likely to run afoul of anti-fraud regulations. Consumers who rely on seller-
advisors are vulnerable not only in the moment of the financial transaction, 
but also in their inability to recover for injury caused by heeding the seller-
advisor’s advice. We have focused our study on buyers dealing with seller-
advisors in an effort to determine how likely buyers are to trust seller-
advisors and whether and when that trust leads to taking the seller-advisor’s 
advice. 
In this Part of the Article, we consider the legal rules available to buy-
ers and sellers.47 We focus on protections offered to buyers and consider 
when those protections are most effective to help unsophisticated buyers 
dealing with sophisticated sellers. Finally, we show how buyers who rely on 
seller-advisors are stuck in an awkward place without specific regulatory 
protection. In such circumstances, contracting parties may have to rely on 
trust to enter transactions with one another. The next Part considers whether 
trust is realistically available to facilitate these transactions48 before we turn 
to the results of our study to reveal what we have learned about the role of 
trust in transactions between consumers and seller-advisors.49 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Honorable Shelden Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an Historical Understanding of 
Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM. L.J. 168, 185 (1999) (describing how con-
sumer protection statutes were enacted to protect against “inequitable and deceptive trade practic-
es” that do not meet the requirements of common-law fraud). 
 45 Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 25, at 1291. 
 46 John F. Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2010, at 20, 25 
(“[A]n arm’s length business transaction does not create a fiduciary relationship. This is so even 
when one party has superior bargaining power.”). 
 47 See infra notes 50–129 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 130–272 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 280–245 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Law Forbids Deception 
The law protecting consumers from deception often grows from no-
tions of what information buyers and sellers must share with each other in 
an arm’s length transaction. The doctrine of caveat emptor, or “buyer be-
ware,” places responsibility with buyers for making specific inquiries of a 
seller.50 As long as the seller answers honestly, the buyer has no recourse 
for harm resulting from a lack of information.51 Fraud prohibits material 
misstatements given with an intent to deceive in response to such inquiries 
from buyers.52 The seller may have information about the product to be sold 
that would be valuable to the buyer and would change the buyer’s estima-
tion of how much to pay for the purchase, but the seller is entitled to with-
hold that information.53 Sellers may drive a hard bargain and profit gener-
ously from their informational advantage as long as they do not deceive 
buyers.54 Allowing buyers and sellers to take advantage of superior infor-
mation encourages investment in information and helps products move to 
whomever values them most.55 
In order to establish a case for fraud, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
four elements are present.56 First, there must have been a misrepresentation 
of fact.57 An opinion or overstated puffery will not support a fraud claim.58 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons 
Learned from the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 101–03 (2008) (discussing 
the meaning and historical context of the doctrine). The caveat emptor doctrine, or “let the buyer 
beware,” is often interpreted incorrectly, with its converse taking hold as the correct meaning. See 
id. at 93 (“[T]he caveat emptor rule, . . . in its purest form, requires that the seller say nothing to 
the buyer with respect to the condition of the premises sold.”). 
 51 Id. at 93–94 (illustrating a buyer’s lack of legal recourse in the absence of “active conceal-
ment” or misrepresentation). 
 52 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579 (1996) (holding that “actionable fraud 
requires a material misrepresentation or omission,” which includes “deliberate false statements, 
acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive”). 
 53 Johnson, supra note 50, at 104 (“[T]he caveat emptor doctrine is or at least began as a rule 
of silence. If the seller remains silent and takes no steps to warrant the condition or quality of the 
premises, caveat emptor provides a safe harbor for the seller.”). 
 54 Id. at 103. 
 55 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Mistake and Nondisclosure in Contract Law, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 335, 336 (2010) (“[T]he basic idea is that the common law generally permits the 
party who has invested in developing or gathering information to internalize the gains those efforts 
make available.”). 
 56 A typical statement of the elements of a cause of action for fraud is as follows: 
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law 
for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon 
it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his 
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 57 Id. 
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The misrepresented fact must be material to the plaintiff’s decision to agree 
to the transaction.59 Ancillary facts that are not a proximate cause of the 
decision to complete the transaction will not lead to liability for fraud.60 
Second, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with scienter, or the 
intent to deceive.61 Innocent or negligent misrepresentations do not consti-
tute fraud.62 This state of mind requirement is particularly difficult for 
plaintiffs to meet, as mens rea is usually difficult to prove.63 Third, a plain-
tiff must have relied on the misstatement in deciding to complete the trans-
action.64 The reliance requirement is related to materiality in that both ele-
ments concern whether the plaintiff would have agreed to the transaction 
but for the misstatement.65 Fourth, a plaintiff must suffer damages on ac-
count of the fraudulent statement.66 There is generally no cause of action for 
fraud where a plaintiff is tricked into paying fair market value for value re-
ceived.67 The result of these limitations on fraud liability is that there are 
many transactions in which an unsophisticated consumer may be taken ad-
vantage of and unable to obtain a remedy by appeal to fraud alone. Fraud 
liability will not stop or even discourage many practices that can harm con-
sumers and undermine faith in the market. 
The limitations of fraud liability led to causes of action for negligent 
misrepresentation and the promulgation of consumer protection statutes.68 A 
party may be liable for negligent misrepresentation in business transactions 
where one party is more knowledgeable than the other and the more knowl-
edgeable party was careless in a way that harmed the less knowledgeable 
party.69 This liability could apply to any salesperson who knows more about 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 44, at 182 (“The puffery doctrine is a defense asserting that 
some forward-looking statements are so amorphous as to not affect the price of a security. Accord-
ingly, they are not material under a fraud analysis.”). 
 59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525. 
 60 Id. § 538. 
 61 Id. §§ 525–526. 
 62 PETER A. ALCES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2:13 (2015) (“The plaintiff must 
show . . . that the defendant was aware of the falsity.”). 
 63 See Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 44, at 188.  
 64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537. 
 65 Id. § 538. 
 66 Id. § 525. 
 67 Id. § 549 (explaining that damages for fraud may be based on either the difference between 
the value and purchase price, or other pecuniary losses suffered). 
 68 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 104 (discussing how “once the seller begins to speak[,] . . . 
even short of fraud, courts are willing to impose a duty on the seller to be truthful and nonnegli-
gent with respect to those representations”). 
 69 See ALCES, supra note 62, § 2:3. The basic elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim 
as outlined by the Supreme Court of Washington are as follows: 
(1) [T]he defendant supplied information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions that was false; (2) the defendant knew or should have known that the in-
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the product they are selling than the consumer, if the consumer relies on the 
salesperson for guidance (as they often do). It would seem to address much 
of the ground covered by consumer protection statutes. In today’s complex 
market of goods and services, consumers cannot possibly understand every-
thing they are buying as well as the companies selling them.70 They often 
rely on those companies for knowledge and guidance. That reliance exposes 
companies and their sales associates, or others who communicate with po-
tential customers, to liability for negligent misrepresentation if the consum-
er is misled at all.71 
Consumer protection statutes build on the promise and premises of 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation liability to outlaw deceptive devices 
and practices, and require full, truthful disclosures in enumerated circum-
stances.72 Negligent misrepresentation liability does not reach material 
omissions, and fraud doctrine only provides for liability where there is a 
duty to disclose particular information.73 Neither doctrine remedies or pre-
vents sharp practices where only accurate information is shared with con-
sumers, but it is shared in a piecemeal manner not designed to help the con-
sumer make the best decision. States and the federal government have man-
dated disclosure in certain circumstances to respond to those shortcom-
ings.74 Mandatory disclosure has resulted in long boilerplate contracts that 
are impractical for consumers to read or understand.75 Over-disclosure may 
prove more harmful than under-disclosure because in both instances, the 
consumer remains ignorant—the consumer who has received a tome of in-
formation that they do not read, for instance, may assume they are somehow 
protected by the provision of that information.76 The false sense of security 
                                                                                                                           
formation was supplied to guide the plaintiff in his business transactions; (3) the de-
fendant was negligent in obtaining or communicating the false information; (4) the 
plaintiff relied on the false information; (5) the plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable; 
and (6) the false information proximately caused the plaintiff damages. 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (stating the elements to establish liabil-
ity for “information negligently supplied for the guidance of others”). 
 70 See Mascarenhas et al., supra note 40, at 68 (describing the concept of “information asym-
metry” and the fact that “marketers know more about their products and services than prospective 
buyers do”). 
 71 Johnson, supra note 50, at 104–11 (discussing the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation 
and the ways in which sellers may be held liable for statements made to consumers).  
 72 Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 44, at 185. 
 73 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972) (holding 
that an omission can form the basis of securities fraud, and the requirement of reliance is met 
when there is a failure to fulfill a duty to disclose). 
 74 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 4–7. 
 75 Id. at 6–7. 
 76 Id. at 11–12. 
2018] Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of Trust 943 
may keep the consumer from asking more questions or approaching the 
transaction with self-protective skepticism.77 
Consumer protection statutes go beyond mandatory disclosure and at-
tempt to directly address deceptive practices more broadly, targeting sales 
tactics that might mislead consumers even if they are not technically 
fraudulent.78 Flexibility around those standards and the ability to intervene 
to provide remedies for strategically misled consumers makes consumer 
protection regimes more responsive to consumer injuries.79 The streamlined 
administrative process for lodging complaints and determining consumer 
remedies also makes the consumer protection system more accessible and 
less expensive than litigation.80 
Fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and consumer protection laws oper-
ate to provide an honest environment in which consumers can transact busi-
ness with sellers who may be more knowledgeable about the transaction. The 
effect of the laws is to prevent relatively unsophisticated consumers from be-
ing directly deceived or taken advantage of in ways they cannot otherwise 
prevent or anticipate.81 These laws cannot, however, completely protect con-
sumers from their own ignorance. Even if sellers are completely honest and 
faithfully follow disclosure laws, consumers will often find themselves at a 
disadvantage in any number of transactions, perhaps never more so than 
when a consumer delegates control over a sensitive personal matter to anoth-
er. The next Section considers how the law protects these particularly vulner-
able consumers.82 
B. The Law Protects Some Expectations and Vulnerabilities 
When a consumer wants to buy a toaster or a car, she is expected to un-
derstand what the product is and to know what her preferences are for a prod-
uct of that kind. A particular seller may not misrepresent the characteristics of 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. 
 78 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “[u]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”) (emphasis added); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 
(West 2017) (stating that “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” 
are unlawful, including deceptive representations or designations); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 1720 (West 2017) (defining “unfair competition”). 
 79 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (explaining that the title addressing remedies “shall be 
liberally construed and applied”); Melinda Rose Smolin, Investment Securities: Beyond the Scope 
of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 127, 133 (1991) (discuss-
ing how “[t]he ‘liberal construction’ language implies that more causes of action . . . should come 
within the scope of the Act,” and thus provides plentiful avenues for consumer protection)). 
 80 See Lisa Yurwit, Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions: Stop the Reliance on Reli-
ance, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 393, 413 (2007) (arguing that procedures for handling administrative 
claims would provide for a more fluid recovery process than prolonged litigation). 
 81 See Mascarenhas et al., supra note 40, at 78. 
 82 See infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text. 
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a particular good. Beyond that obligation, however, the seller is free to profit 
from the consumer’s lack of knowledge about the product or even about the 
degree to which a particular product meets her needs or desires.83 
But when a person enlists someone’s professional advice or delegates 
control over her property or some sensitive decision making to a professional, 
the law imposes fiduciary duties to govern those relationships.84 Fiduciaries 
owe duties of loyalty and care.85 In some circumstances, fiduciaries may owe 
a duty referred to as “prudence,”86 while in others, a duty of disclosure is 
claimed.87 While many non-fiduciary actors are subject to a duty of care par-
ticular to their circumstances, the duties of loyalty and prudence are unique to 
fiduciary relationships.88 A fiduciary duty of loyalty requires at least that the 
fiduciary abstain from acting on interests that conflict with those of the bene-
ficiary.89 A duty of prudence refers to the “prudent man rule” and applies in 
trust situations, requiring a trustee to administer the trust and either invest or 
hold its assets with the same degree of care and skill a prudent person would 
exercise in the administration of their own affairs.90 
Fiduciary principles are designed to protect parties who rely on the 
judgment and discretion of others in controlling property, making sensitive, 
personal decisions, or agreeing to contracts.91 Most scholars agree that fidu-
ciary duties exist to force the alignment of the fiduciary’s interests with 
those of the beneficiary, and thereby to allow the kinds of transactions in 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 104. 
 84 Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 25, at 1291, 1293. 
 85 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999) (discussing the duty of loyalty); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduci-
ary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 903 (2011) (discussing Justice Cardozo’s famous judicial ex-
pression that fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty which is “one of selfless behavior”). 
 86 See Leo E. Strine et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Cor-
poration Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 654–55 (2010) (explaining that if a fiduciary is to act on his own 
as a free-standing fiduciary, he must act in accordance with certain duties, including “prudence”). 
 87 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1995) 
[hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Duties]. 
 88 See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215–16 (ex-
plaining the unique nature of and need for fiduciary duties). 
 89 See Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 299; Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 87, at 1210. 
 90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (AM. LAW. INST. 2007) (construing the “prudent 
investor rule” to mean that the trustee must act as a reasonable person would if they were in con-
trol of the trust, including the use of reasonable skill and care to preserve the property and make 
the trust productive); see also Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 465 (1830) (articu-
lating the “prudent man rule” as requiring that trustees “conduct themselves honestly and discreet-
ly and carefully, according to the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their trusts”). 
 91 Ribstein, supra note 88, at 229 (explaining problems that result when confidential information is 
entrusted to non-fiduciaries rather than constraining the discretion of confidential information through one 
who exercises power over another’s property (a fiduciary)); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theo-
ry of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1460 (2002) (“The imposition of fiduciary duties can protect 
creditors during the transitional period, when they are particularly vulnerable because the managers of the 
debtor would recognize the inevitability of the control transfer.”). 
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which fiduciaries are enlisted to be completed.92 Relatively unsophisticated 
or vulnerable parties may stay out of given markets altogether, may be kept 
from robust participation in society or hampered in their accumulation of 
wealth if they are unable to rely on fiduciaries to navigate areas in which 
they lack the time and expertise to act for themselves. 
Fiduciary law allows courts to review a relationship after a problem 
has occurred to determine to what extent and in what way a fiduciary acted 
inappropriately.93 This somewhat flexible ex post review is necessary be-
cause beneficiaries lack the time and expertise to monitor fiduciaries closely 
and lack the expertise necessary to write detailed contracts about how fidu-
ciaries are to exercise discretion.94 In order to truly take advantage of the 
fiduciary’s greater sophistication and expertise, the beneficiary must allow 
the fiduciary to exercise discretion as she sees fit, subject only to the rele-
vant duty of care and the duty of loyalty.95 Attempts to micromanage a fidu-
ciary would undermine the purpose and benefits of the relationship.96 
Relationships designed for the provision of advice are often classified 
as fiduciary to ensure that advice about what is best for a beneficiary is just 
that—best for the beneficiary.97 But sellers at arm’s length are not fiduciar-
ies and the advice they give consumers may well be based on what is best 
for the seller.98 We now consider consumer interactions with these sellers 
who are also called upon to give advice.99 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425, 425 (1993). “Contractarian” scholars argue that fiduciary duties fill gaps in the par-
ties’ contract in a manner consistent with an expectation that the fiduciary be bound by fiduciary 
obligations of loyalty and care. See id. (“The duty of loyalty, coupled with restitution of any gain 
the trustee obtains by favoring his own interest, defines a special relation.”). “Anti-contractarian” 
scholars view fiduciary relationships as being relationships of trust that rise above typical contrac-
tual rules and practices. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 555 n.6 (2001). 
They agree with contractarians, however, that the purpose of imposing fiduciary duties is to ensure 
that the fiduciary acts in a manner consistent with the best interests of the beneficiary. Frankel, 
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 87, at 1211–12, 1229 (“The ‘goodness’ expected of fiduciaries con-
sists of refraining from taking what is not theirs, without permission.”). 
 93 Ribstein, supra note 88, at 216. 
 94 Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 25, at 1296. 
 95 Id. at 1293. 
 96 See id. (“[I]t is in the interest of society that non-experts use fiduciaries’ services and avoid 
wasteful duplication of these services.”). 
 97 See Smith, supra note 91, at 1409 (“In the fiduciary context, the duty of loyalty requires the 
fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an ongoing basis to avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs 
the beneficiary.”). 
 98 See Mariani et al., supra note 46, at 25. 
 99 See infra notes 100–129 and accompanying text. 
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C. The No-Law’s Land of Seller-Advisor Transactions 
Seller-advisors are sellers of products who may provide advice to con-
sumers about whether to buy the seller’s product or under what terms to do 
business with the seller.100 When sellers offer particularly complex products 
or present their customers with a number of choices that may be beyond 
most consumers’ experiences, consumers will ask for advice. Pure advisors 
are typically considered fiduciaries because giving advice requires one to 
consider the best interests of the recipient of the advice.101 That advice 
would not be valuable if the advisor allowed her personal interests to inter-
fere or determine the nature of the advice. Pure sellers are emphatically not 
fiduciaries.102 They pursue self-interest in trying to convince as many con-
sumers as possible to buy their products at the highest price the market will 
bear. Seller-advisors are often compensated in ways that reward them for 
up-selling consumers or convincing consumers to buy more of a product 
than they may need. Those interests are obvious to consumers in some con-
texts and completely opaque in others. 
Seller-advisors enjoy the most power when they sell complex products 
that consumers need help understanding, when products are expensive, or 
when the product otherwise presents significant decision-making im-
portance.103 On a small scale, a waiter in a restaurant is a seller-advisor, but a 
much more powerful seller-advisor is a surgeon or a mortgage broker. Con-
sumers need advice to navigate more complex markets, and the more money 
or welfare on the line, the more afraid they will be of making the wrong 
choice. While we found that consumers do not always defer to advice under 
such circumstances, they are more cautious and less comfortable making de-
cisions they do not understand.104 In the face of this vulnerability, individual 
seller-advisors may be able to have the most influence. 
More complex products are not only difficult to understand, but the 
markets in which they are offered are sufficiently complex that consumers 
will not always understand the incentives the seller-advisor has that may 
motivate the advice they give. Many mortgage borrowers likely have no 
idea how the mortgage lender representative or broker is paid. Patients may 
not know how doctors are paid or even what alternatives a doctor may con-
sider and discard along the way to giving advice. While consumers might 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 101 See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 25; Smith, supra note 91. 
 102 See Mariani et al., supra note 46, at 25. 
 103 See Mascarenhas et al., supra note 40, at 72–73 (“Modern economies include many activi-
ties like selling cars, houses, and electronic goods, where product quality and product attributes 
are complex and sellers know far more about what they sell than buyers know about what they 
buy.”). 
 104 See infra notes 207–208 and accompanying text. 
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understand that car salespeople work on commission, they do not necessarily 
understand the other ways a dealership makes money or what components of 
the price allow the dealership to extract gains from the sale of the car. 
The complexity and opacity of a seller-advisor’s role in a sales transac-
tion can harm consumers. It can convince a consumer to make a substantial 
purchase that causes him to suffer significant financial or other harm. It can 
lead a consumer to act against his best interests, locking him into a decision 
with long-term consequences he does not fully understand or appreciate. 
Even at the beginning of the process, a lack of understanding of the seller-
advisor’s incentives can prevent a consumer from asking the questions re-
quired to understand the purchase or transaction, leaving him irretrievably 
under-informed about the decision at hand. In situations where a consumer 
has to make a quick decision, such as when choosing the terms of a mort-
gage loan, the consumer may defer to a seller-advisor whose interests sharp-
ly conflict with his own because he does not have time to do otherwise. A 
seller-advisor would not have to lie at all in order to lead a consumer to 
make a decision against his own interests, so fraud liability would not pro-
tect such a consumer.105 
Likewise, fiduciary liability would not be available to remedy the inju-
ry suffered by a consumer led astray in most seller-advisor relationships.106 
Most sellers, whose interests are in having the consumer pay as much as 
possible for as many goods or services as possible, definitionally cannot be 
fiduciaries.107 A party that is primarily a seller of goods or services and who 
operates through sales agents—whose job is to sell as many products for as 
much money as possible—will not be considered a fiduciary and will not be 
bound by fiduciary duties.108 Such sellers will not have to consider the in-
terests of the consumer at all and can give advice that runs directly counter 
to the consumer’s best interests as long as they do not commit fraud. 
Fiduciary duties do not bind fiduciaries to capture perfectly the best in-
terests of a beneficiary. Even fiduciaries can be imperfect seller-advisors in 
some circumstances.109 Fiduciaries have to be paid for their services and so 
in those negotiations act as sellers of their services.110 Most fiduciaries, 
however, are not primarily engaged in selling. They negotiate a price for the 
fiduciary relationship and then go about doing their work on the consumer’s 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See supra notes 50–82 and accompanying text. 
 106 See supra notes 83–99 and accompanying text. 
 107 See Mariani et al., supra note 46, at 25. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary 
Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955, 971–72 (1995). 
 110 Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 25, at 1294 (explaining that fiduciaries are entitled to 
compensation for their services and if an entrustor does not have funds to compensate the fiduci-
ary, they may deem part of the assets to the fiduciary as payment). 
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behalf. Further, and perhaps most importantly, fiduciaries are always pro-
tected by something like a business judgment rule.111 That is, as long as a 
fiduciary’s advice is given in good faith and not the result of an undisclosed 
conflict of interest, the advice does not have to be the best course of action 
for the beneficiary—it does not have to be “right.”112 A variety of influences 
may push the fiduciary to give advice contrary to the interests of the benefi-
ciary, but still not result in liability for breach of the duty of loyalty because 
there were no direct conflicts of interest or the advice was given in good 
faith and within the standard of care.113 
An example of a fiduciary relationship that could be influenced by un-
expected interests is the doctor/patient relationship. Doctors are fiduciaries of 
patients and are expected to avoid or disclose any financial interests they have 
that would conflict with the patient’s interests in care.114 However, doctors are 
not required to know everything about the conditions they treat and they are 
not expected to know of or have access to all experimental or new treatments, 
even those that relate to conditions they treat regularly.115 A doctor’s standard 
of care simply does not require them to be all-knowing.116 Doctors are there-
fore allowed and expected to skew their advice in favor of their experience. A 
surgeon would not violate her fiduciary duties to her patient if she recom-
mended surgery—even if another treatment would be as or more effective—
as long as surgery would not be inappropriate for the patient’s condition.117 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002) (“[T]he business judgment rule acts as a presumption in favor of cor-
porate managers’ actions. . . . provid[ing] a safe harbor that makes both directors and their actions 
unassailable if certain prerequisites have been met.”). 
 112 See Dickerson, supra note 109, at 959 (providing an example demonstrating that if a trans-
action does not involve a conflict of interest, the transaction will be considered to have been exe-
cuted “in good faith”). 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary 
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 455 (2000) (discussing the history of 
the doctor-patient relationship and the notion of fiduciary relationships eventually applying to that 
relationship). “In the course of this expansion, the fiduciary model was applied to the doctor-
patient relationship, and doctors and commentators, and later judges, came to refer to doctors as 
fiduciaries.” Id. 
 115 Gerald J. Smoller, Standard of Care: “Reasonable Man” Doctrine, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
107, 107 (1967) (explaining that though doctors have knowledge superior to an ordinary person 
and must act in a manner that is reasonably “consistent with this higher knowledge,” they need not 
be all-knowing). 
 116 Id. A doctor’s standard of care requires a doctor to “possess and apply the knowledge and 
use the skill and care that is ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors in the locality in 
which he practices or in similar localities in similar cases and circumstances.” Id. (quoting ILL. 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 105.02 (1961), now located at § 105.01). 
 117 See Oberman, supra note 114, at 459 (explaining how, despite the terminology of fiduci-
ary duty being applied to physicians, the law generally does not enforce a physician’s fiduciary 
duty). 
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Such a surgeon would have an obvious financial interest in recommending 
surgery that may conflict with the patient’s interest in a minimally invasive 
treatment.118 A patient may not be sensitive to the doctor’s interest or may 
assume that the surgeon is giving equal weight to all available treatment 
methods when making a final recommendation. Nothing in the law protects 
the patient from his lack of understanding of the doctor’s incentives or from 
the doctor’s lack of knowledge of alternative treatments.119 A patient’s choic-
es are simply to rely on this seller-advisor’s recommendation, conduct re-
search, or find another advisor who may make a different recommendation. 
An example of a non-fiduciary in a sensitive seller-advisor position is 
a stockbroker.120 Brokers, as opposed to investment advisors who do owe 
fiduciary duties, must only be paid for making trades and any advice they 
give is considered incidental to making the trade.121 As such, brokers may 
not charge for advice.122 Instead of a fiduciary obligation, brokers have 
simply been held to a “suitability” standard that requires them to recom-
mend only securities to their clients that are appropriate given the particular 
client’s wishes and financial circumstances.123 
In a sense, brokers are the car salesmen of the securities world. They 
place orders for traders and may give information about securities, but it is 
generally known that they are working on commission.124 It is well known 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See id. at 461 (“Malpractice law has yet to hold physicians liable for actions motivated by 
financial conflicts of interest.”). 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Lynn Bai, Broker-Dealers, Institutional Investors, and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado 
About Nothing?, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2014) (“Broker-dealers generally do 
not owe a fiduciary duty to their clients under federal law, but some courts have imposed a fiduci-
ary duty under limited circumstances when there is a special trust relationship or when a broker-
dealer exercises control over trading activities of the client.”); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker 
Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 52 (2011) 
(“[U]nder the Exchange Act, broker-dealers are not subject to an explicit fiduciary standard 
. . . .”). But see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g)(1), Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1828 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012)) (grant-
ing authority to the Securities Exchange Commission to establish a fiduciary duty for brokers and 
dealers). 
 121 See Hazen, supra note 120, at 53 (“Moreover, because the representative was not giving 
general investment advice, the absence of special compensation for the advice rendered the advice 
incidental to his activities as a broker-dealer.”). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See FINRA R. 2111 (2014), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display html?rbid=2403
&record_id=15663&element_id=9859&highlight=2111#r15663 [https://perma.cc/F38B-HFBZ] 
(requiring that a broker-dealer or associated person “have a reasonable basis to believe that a rec-
ommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer,” and identifying “three main obligations: reasonable-basis suitability, customer-specific 
suitability, and quantitative suitability”); Hazen, supra note 120, at 52. 
 124 See Harlan Landes, Brokers Are Salespeople, Not Financial Advisors, FORBES (July 11, 
2012, 5:31 PM), https://www forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2012/07/11/brokers-are-salespeople-
not-financial-advisers/#4e2397133dc0 [https://perma.cc/6KCW-LXPA] (“Stockbrokers facing the 
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by many traders that a broker’s job is not to devise a long-term investment 
plan tailored to a particular client’s needs, but rather to simply place orders 
for, and perhaps recommend, suitable securities.125 Securities are not as fa-
miliar of a product as cars, however, and retail traders often have a less so-
phisticated understanding of a broker’s incentives and compensation struc-
ture; a misunderstanding about a broker’s intentions is more likely to im-
pose a greater risk of loss.126 Retail investors often cannot tell the difference 
between an investment advisor who does owe fiduciary duties and a stock-
broker who does not.127 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) has considered imposing fiduciary duties on stockbrokers, but has 
not enacted regulations to do so yet.128 
The law does not help consumers very much in their interactions with 
seller-advisors. Consumers do not necessarily understand the seller-advisor’s 
interests, and the law does not require that seller-advisors explain their fi-
nancial incentives to consumers. We wonder why consumers are turning to 
seller-advisors so often and how much they rely on the advice of seller-
advisors. Without legal protection, what are consumers relying on to fill in the 
gaps in their knowledge in navigating these transactions? Is it trust? Trust or 
some sort of confidence may partly explain consumers’ decisions to enter into 
these transactions and whether and when consumers defer to seller-advisors’ 
recommendations. The next Part of the Article considers the social science 
research on trust to put in perspective our study addressing these questions 
about consumer behavior.129 
                                                                                                                           
general investing public working for JP Morgan Chase, might have business cards with a title of 
‘financial advisor,’ but just like the people you meet when you walk into a car dealership, they are 
salespeople.”); Jim Norman, Americans Rate Healthcare Providers High on Honesty, Ethics, 
GALLUP NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/200057/americans-rate-healthcare-
providers-high-honesty-ethics.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z3ZP-NHQG] (showing that stockbrokers 
and car salespeople received low scores in public perception of their trustworthiness). 
 125 Craig A. Cunningham, Mind the Gap: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Stockbroker 
Overtime Eligibility Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1249 n.37 
(“However, it should be noted this statement operates under the misleading assumption that the 
stockbroker is successful; it ignores the fact that an underperforming stockbroker whose pay is 
chiefly derived from commissions will take home a meager wage compared to his successful 
counterparts. There is nothing implicit in the stockbroker’s occupation that guarantees success.”). 
A “stockbroker—though involved in an intricately complex and sophisticated industry—is, at his 
core, nothing more than a salesman.” Id. at 1266. 
 126 See Landes, supra note 124. 
 127 See Bai, supra note 120, at 57–58 (comparing the duties of investment advisors and bro-
ker-dealers). 
 128 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Releases Staff Study Recommending a 
Uniform Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors (Jan. 22, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-20 htm [https://perma.cc/L773-4NKC]. 
 129 See infra notes 130–166 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TRUST 
The act of trusting is comprised of a variety of beliefs, emotions, and 
actions. Trusting is, essentially, a belief in the trustworthiness of another.130 
It is a willingness to be vulnerable to the behavior of another and a belief 
that the other will behave as agreed or expected, that she will keep her 
promises, be honest, and comport herself in accordance with social norms 
of good will and civility.131 Those beliefs, coupled with an emotional will-
ingness to be vulnerable and assume the risk that the other person will turn 
out to be untrustworthy—even when that risk is recommended in light of 
rational calculation—may lead to trusting behavior.132 Trusting behavior 
turns those beliefs and predispositions into action: leaving one’s fate in the 
hands of another, deferring to another’s decision-making or efforts in place 
of one’s own, cooperating at a cost, and trusting that the other party will 
also cooperate.133 There may be a disconnect between the degree of trust a 
potential trustor claims and his or her choice about whether to engage in 
trusting behavior.134 
Trust is “socialized.”135 Not only is it considered socially acceptable to 
give others the benefit of the doubt, to “trust” that they will behave compe-
tently, honestly, and with regard for our well-being, but there are also tangi-
ble benefits to trusting.136 People who are trusted are more likely to be 
                                                                                                                           
 130 HARDIN, supra note 39, at 1. 
 131 David Dunning & Detlef Fetchenhauer, Understanding the Psychology of Trust, in SOCIAL 
MOTIVATION 147, 148 (David Dunning ed., 2011); see HARDIN, supra note 39, at 17 (“To say we 
trust you means we believe you have the right intentions toward us and that you are competent to 
do what we trust you to do.”). 
 132 Dunning & Fetchenhauer, supra note 131, at 148. 
 133 Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 709, 724–26 (1995) (turning from a description of the elements of trust to an analysis of 
when a combination of those elements leads a person to engage in “risk taking” while in a rela-
tionship). 
 134 KATHERINE HAWLEY, TRUST: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 11 (2012); Mayer et al., 
supra note 133, at 724–26. 
 135 See Dunning & Fetchenhauer, supra note 131, at 149–50; David Dunning et al., Trust as a 
Social and Emotional Act: Noneconomic Considerations in Trust Behavior, 33 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
686, 687 (2012); Ribstein, supra note 92, at 553–54 (“Trusting people cooperate because it is in 
their nature or because they have been socialized to do it, not because some costly structure has 
been set up to ensure reliability.”). 
 136 Dunning et al., supra note 135, at 690–91 (pointing out that trusting is the socially ac-
ceptable choice according to prevailing norms and that participants in experiments are more likely 
to act as though they trust strangers in contexts in which there is a real, rather than hypothetical, 
social interaction); Ribstein, supra note 92, at 564 (explaining that in society, “people operate 
under an honor system where they make themselves vulnerable to others and are trustworthy 
without strictly calculating costs and benefits”); cf. David Dunning et al., Trust at Zero Acquaint-
ance: More a Matter of Respect Than Expectation of Reward, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 122, 136 (2014) (clarifying that trust is not a social norm so much as a personal, moral 
norm). 
952 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:931 
trustworthy, and trusting behavior acts as a “social lubricant” allowing ben-
eficial interactions to occur.137 
A. The Elements of Trust 
The literature has coalesced around a few common elements of trust. 
They can be summarized as ability, benevolence, and integrity.138 Ability cap-
tures elements such as competence, expertise, and judgment.139 Benevolence 
refers to a trustee’s intrinsic motivation to act for the benefit of a trustor.140 
Integrity refers to a trustee’s reliability, openness, honesty, and sense of hon-
or.141 Integrity is often defined as a person’s adherence to a personal code 
and, in the context of trust, the adherence to a personal code that a trustor 
finds appropriate.142 A trustor must believe in the existence of all of these el-
ements in a trustee before engaging in trusting behavior.143 Deferring to the 
judgment of someone who is benevolent but incompetent can lead to danger-
ous outcomes, just as would trusting someone who adheres to a well-defined 
personal code, but wants to harm the trustor. 
Although many interactions in which trust would be useful are formed 
quickly and last only briefly, some elements of trust take time to establish. 
Ability is the easiest element to establish quickly.144 A seller might be able to 
give credible signs of expertise rather quickly by demonstrating a length of 
experience or seniority or by accruing and publicizing impressive credentials. 
In a competitive market, a seller of services may be able to signal a high de-
                                                                                                                           
 137 HAWLEY, supra note 134, at 11 (“If we are genuinely unsure whether someone can be 
relied upon, we may decide to take our chances and trust her. Such trust can encourage trustwor-
thiness when people react positively to being trusted, and this in turn can justify the original deci-
sion to trust.”); see Ribstein, supra note 92, at 553 n.1 (citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE 
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 151 (1995)). 
 138 Roy J. Lewicki & Edward V. Tomlinson, Trust and Trust Building, BEYOND INTRACTA-
BILITY KNOWLEDGE BASE PROJECT (Dec. 2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/trust-
building [https://perma.cc/BK9S-W6K2] (“[T]he more we observe [ability, benevolence, and 
integrity] in another person, our level of trust in that person is likely to grow.”); see also Mayer et 
al., supra note 133, at 717–19 (discussing how ability, benevolence, and integrity each contribute 
a unique perceptual perspective that provides for “a solid and parsimonious foundation for the 
empirical study of trust”). 
 139 Mayer et al., supra note 133, at 717–18 (“Ability is that group of skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain. The domain of 
the ability is specific because the trustee may be highly competent in some technical area, afford-
ing that person trust on tasks related to that area.”). 
 140 Id. at 718–19 (“Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good 
to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive.”). 
 141 Id. at 719–20 (“The relationship between integrity and trust involves the trustor’s percep-
tion that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable.”). 
 142 Id. at 719. 
 143 Id. at 721. 
 144 Id. at 717–18. 
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gree of competence by commanding top dollar for her services. Other habits 
such as punctuality, organization, responsiveness, and reliability can quickly 
signal competence and attentiveness. Personal integrity can be idiosyncratic, 
so it may be difficult for consumers to see until they develop a long working 
relationship with a seller or advisor.145 In professions with codes of ethics or 
professional responsibility, remaining a member of good standing in the ap-
posite professional licensing organization can indicate an adherence to a code 
of conduct and so may give a hint to a degree of integrity. But, such rules 
cannot be sufficiently detailed to give consumers much assurance that a pro-
fessional is personally or intrinsically bound to an honorable code of conduct 
that would ensure that the relationship is a productive one for the consum-
er.146 Moreover, many of the seller-advisors we are concerned with are not 
bound by professional codes of ethics. Such codes usually apply to profes-
sionals who owe fiduciary duties to their clients anyway and function to pro-
vide guidance to professionals and their clients about obligations owed by 
fiduciaries.147 
Among the three elements of trust, a belief in the benevolence of a 
trustee takes the most time to develop.148 Benevolence is a belief that the 
particular trustee is personally motivated to pursue the best interests of the 
trustor.149 A potential trustee may be able to establish a reputation for be-
nevolence generally and may be able to provide some assurance in its man-
ner of conducting business that it is willing to put the interests of others 
ahead of its own. For example, a seller-advisor may be able to make an ad-
mission against interest or share its own interests in a transaction in a way 
that allows the trustor to take that information into account.150 
Openness is a sign of benevolence.151 Benevolence can take time to es-
tablish because it requires that the parties understand and internalize each 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Id. at 719–20. 
 146 See HAWLEY, supra note 134, at 57–60 (describing how certain categories of people are 
believed to be trustworthy); Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, It’s Time to Make Management a 
True Profession, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2008, at 70, 72 (“Through [professional] codes, profes-
sional institutions forge an implicit social contract with other members of society: Trust us to 
control and exercise jurisdiction over this important occupational category.”). 
 147See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 1–2 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016) (describing how 
doctors are also fiduciaries and guided by the American Medical Association Code of Ethics). See 
generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (describing how lawyers 
owe fiduciary duties to their clients and are subject to Rules of Professional Responsibility in each 
state). 
 148 See Mayer et al., supra note 133, at 718–19. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See infra notes 231–245 and accompanying text. 
 151 Mayer et al., supra note 133, at 718–19 (explaining that openness measured through ques-
tions about the trustee’s openness with others, as well as the trustor, is related to benevolence and 
integrity). 
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other’s interests.152 Only then can the trustee truly pursue the trustor’s inter-
ests, and only then can the trustor know the trustee is doing so out of con-
cern for the trustor.153 Benevolence may be the hardest element to establish, 
but social norms support giving potential trustees the benefit of the doubt 
that they are working to advance the goals of those who trust them, or are at 
least not undermining those goals.154 In practice, in low stakes situations, 
that benefit of the doubt may support the necessary degree of faith in be-
nevolence to complete the transaction or for a trustor to take a trustee’s ad-
vice.155 In higher stakes situations or when more important, significant deci-
sions are involved, benevolence may be the element of trust that is lacking, 
and its absence may prevent the consumer from “trusting” or relying on the 
advice of the seller-advisor.156 
B. Trust and the Seller-Advisor 
Some seller-advisors and consumers have repeated interactions and 
can build relationships that include a strong sense of benevolence.157 Many 
consumers, however, must seek and decide to follow a seller-advisor’s ad-
vice much more quickly and without time to investigate the seller-advisor 
beyond learning a little bit about their reputation and, perhaps, credentials. 
In such situations, trust may be transferred from a recommender of the sell-
er-advisor to the seller-advisor. For instance, a homebuyer may have a long-
standing, trusting relationship with her real estate agent and then rely on the 
real estate agent to identify a trustworthy mortgage lender with whom the 
real estate agent has a long-standing trusting relationship. 
We are most interested in what happens when a consumer must make a 
quick, important decision about a transaction which the consumer does not 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Lewicki & Tomlinson, supra note 138 (describing identification-based relationships as 
those where the parties develop a thorough understanding of each other’s goals and motivations 
after a number of interactions so that they are able to truly act in each other’s stead). Such rela-
tionships have a high degree of benevolence that finds its foundation in the strong personal rela-
tionship between the parties. Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Dunning & Fetchenhauer, supra note 131, at 123; Mayer et al., supra note 133, at 
718–19. 
 155 See HAWLEY, supra note 134, at 1–2 (describing the many low stakes instances of trust 
that occur in daily life); Dunning & Fetchenhauer, supra note 131, at 149 (providing common 
examples of trust in low stakes situations). 
 156 See Tiffany Barnett White, Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating Roles 
of Benevolence, Expertise, and Negative Emotions, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 141, 143 (2005) 
(arguing that “emotionally difficult” decisions are high stakes decisions for which a trustor requires 
emotional support). When making emotionally difficult decisions, trustors are likely to favor benevo-
lence over expertise and rely more heavily on the advice of trustees they know well. Id. 
 157 Mayer et al., supra note 133, at 718 (“Benevolence suggests that the trustee has some 
specific attachment to the trustor.”). 
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understand fully, and so must make a quick decision about whether to trust 
the advice received from the seller-advisor. Can the consumer trust without 
deferring to the advice of the seller-advisor? What is the consumer trusting, 
and how and why is that trust limited? If the consumer follows the seller-
advisor’s advice, is that necessarily evidence of trust, or a simple willing-
ness to roll the dice on an inconsequential choice? 
Human decision making is complex and a variety of factors influence 
the choices individuals make. Biases and preferences can overwhelm care-
ful research and solid, well-intentioned advice.158 Most people do operate 
on a baseline assumption that other people are not out to get them and that 
the people they interact with are basically well-intentioned.159 We are not all 
vigilantly searching for con artists in daily consumer interactions. The belief 
in the basic goodness of others may lead us to take advice in sales situations 
when we do not have enough information to know what our best option is. 
Deferring to a seller-advisor is faster and may well lead to the best outcome. 
Most consumers are happy to bet on the basic goodness of the sellers they 
encounter and to self-insure against the risk that their trust is misplaced.160 
Under-trusting can be a problem that may harm consumers, preventing 
them from gaining the information they need to make the best decisions they 
can in important transactions.161 Sometimes an entire industry can be consid-
ered suspect and will cease to inspire a basic belief in its benevolence.162 
Used car salesmen often join snake oil salesmen as the paradigmatic exam-
ples of distrusted sales professionals.163 Since the financial crisis nine years 
ago, mortgage lenders may have joined their ranks.164 As mortgage lenders 
are in a position to advise relatively unsophisticated consumers about major 
financial transactions, the loss of trust in those relationships can be costly for 
consumers. Still, trusting too much may prove even more costly. 
Whether the choice to defer to the advice of a seller-advisor is a sign 
of trust or something else is significant when considering how to best use 
the law to protect consumer expectations and vulnerabilities. We, as a socie-
ty, typically expect buyers to fend for themselves when they know their in-
                                                                                                                           
 158 Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision Making, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 542, 546–57 (Susan T. Fiske et al., 5th ed. 2010). 
 159 See Dunning & Fetchenhauer, supra note 131, at 149. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 149–50. 
 162 See Norman, supra note 124 (listing professions which the general public views as more 
and less trustworthy). 
 163 Id. 
 164 See infra notes 216, 269–275 and accompanying text; see also Ron Lieber, When to Use a 
Mortgage Broker, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www nytimes.com/2009/04/04/your-money/
mortgages/04money.html [https://perma.cc/H2B5-4HGD] (discussing how the 2008 financial 
crisis tarnished mortgage brokers’ collective image). 
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terests are at odds with those of a seller, and the law offers more protection 
in the form of fiduciary duties and consumer protection statutes when a 
buyer is vulnerable to a seller’s judgment or skill.165 If consumers are trust-
ing, or perhaps over-trusting, to their detriment in certain situations, that is 
important for policy-makers to know and something courts should keep in 
mind when identifying which relationships warrant fiduciary status. Under-
standing the extent to which trust plays a role in more important decisions 
and the extent to which consumers rely on seller-advisors in various situa-
tions will also help illustrate how the law should best support consumers in 
those interactions so that their trust will not be used against them. We now 
turn to our study in which we tried to discover whether and how much con-
sumers trust seller-advisors in various scenarios.166 
III. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: PART ONE 
In this Part, we report the results of our original experiment examining 
the relationship between consumers and seller-advisors. Our experiment is 
designed to test several questions. First, does the presence of seller-
advisors—who provide recommendations to consumers without owing any 
fiduciary duty to put the consumer’s financial interest above their own—
exert influence over consumers’ financial decisions? Second, to the extent 
that seller-advisors do exert influence on consumers’ financial decisions, is 
this because (contrary to current fiduciary duty laws) consumers have 
placed trust and confidence in the seller-advisor? 
We report the results of this study in two parts, consistent with these ex-
perimental research questions. In Part One of this study, participants read a 
vignette in which they imagined themselves completing a commonplace fi-
nancial transaction. In Part One, we manipulated three variables.167 First, we 
presented participants, at random, with one of five different financial scenari-
os: selecting an entrée at a fancy restaurant, selecting a personal training 
package at the local gym, purchasing a brand-new car, purchasing a new 
home, or making a medical decision. Second, we manipulated the stakes of 
the transaction, such that the impact of the financial transaction was conse-
quential or relatively inconsequential.168 Finally, we manipulated whether 
participants were exposed to a seller-advisor during the transaction or navi-
gated the transaction alone.169 We then examined the financial decision that 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See supra notes 38–99 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 173–245 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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we asked our participants to make, and (if they had been exposed to a seller-
advisor) we examined their level of trust in the seller-advisor.170 
If, as we suspect, consumers routinely rely on the advice of seller-
advisors (or, put another way, act as if they are in a fiduciary relationship 
with the seller-advisor and expect that the seller-advisor is attentive to con-
sumers’ best interests), we hypothesize several results from Part One of this 
study. First, we expect that consumers, as a general matter, will trust seller-
advisors across all of our financial scenarios, although the individualized 
nature of these relationships might lead people to trust certain types of sell-
er-advisors more than they do others. 
Second, we expect that the stakes of the transaction will influence con-
sumers’ willingness to trust, but we make no prediction regarding the direc-
tionality of the effect. For example, we imagine that high stakes conditions 
might increase consumers’ sense of unease, and may therefore make them 
more conservative (and less trusting of seller-advisors).171 We could also 
imagine that high stakes transactions might increase consumers’ willingness 
to trust a seller-advisor, particularly with respect to financial transactions 
that are less familiar to consumers.172 
Finally, and most importantly, we expect that the mere presence of a 
seller-advisor will influence consumers’ financial decisions in a particularly 
malevolent manner. We expect that the seller-advisor’s mere recommenda-
tion (vis-à-vis a financial product that secretly benefits the seller-advisor) 
will cause participants to choose that financial product. We further expect 
that participants’ deference to the seller-advisor’s financial recommendation 
is the result of the trust with which consumers imbue the seller-advisor. We 
now turn to the methodology and results of Part One of this study. 
A. Participants 
We recruited 844 participants for this study through the Amazon Me-
chanical Turk online participant recruitment service.173 Once recruited, par-
ticipants were directed to an online survey hosted on the Qualtrics survey 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
 171 See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. 
 173 See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Re-
search: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 366 (2012) (summarizing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of using Mechanical Turk, or MTurk, as an inexpensive platform for 
collecting high quality data from a representative sample of the population); Michael Buhrmester et 
al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3, 5 (2011) (describing how Mturk functions); Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, 
Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1, 2–4 
(2012) (discussing the “unique benefits of using Mechanical Turk as a platform for running online 
experiments”). 
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platform.174 We paid each participant two dollars to complete the study, 
which was advertised as a psychology experiment designed to collect data 
about laypeople’s impressions of different financial transactions.175 All par-
ticipants completed the survey within twenty minutes. 
Our participant sample was a representative cross section of the inter-
net-using population in the United States. Females constituted 51.3% of the 
sample, and the average age of participants was 38.69 years old (with a 
standard deviation of 12.92 years). Participants identifying as Caucasian 
composed 77.5% of the sample, followed by those who identified as Afri-
can-American (8%), Asian-American (7.5%), Hispanic (5.1%), and “other” 
(1.9%). Approximately 52% of the sample had obtained at least a Bache-
lor’s degree from a four-year college or university, and the median house-
hold income of the sample was between $40,000 and $49,999. Nearly 44% 
of the sample had experience with the financial scenario that they encoun-
tered in this study. A complete breakdown of this study’s sample character-
istics appears on page 28 in Table 1.  
B. Procedure and Measures 
After obtaining informed consent to participate in the study, participants 
were told to imagine themselves engaging in one of several common business 
transactions. At the end of each scenario, participants were required to choose 
between two different financial options (a cheaper option or a more expensive 
option). To determine how seller-advisors potentially influence consumers in 
terms of the choices that they make—and whether any such influence stems 
from an increase in trust between the consumer and the seller-advisor—we 
manipulated several variables in this experiment. 
First, we manipulated the nature of the financial transaction to which 
our participants were exposed. There are many financial transactions in 
which most consumers will rely on seller-advisors, persons who may or 
may not owe those consumers fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. It would 
be impossible to devise an experiment that involves all such scenarios, and 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Research Core™, QUALTRICS, https://www.qualtrics.com/research-core/ [https://perma.cc/
GAW7-5PV6]. 
 175 The relevant text reads as follows: 
In this [task] you will be asked to participate in a psychology research study. The 
purpose of the study is to collect your impressions of a summary of a common busi-
ness transaction. This [task] consists of a series of questionnaires. You will have 45 
minutes to complete this [task], but nearly everyone completes it in approximately 
15–20 minutes. You MUST be in a quiet room for the duration of this study, and 
you must be 18 or older to participate. 
Justin Sevier & Kelli Alces Williams, Psychology Study Description (2017) (unpublished 
study instructions) (on file with authors). 
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so we chose five scenarios that represent financial transactions that (1) eve-
ryday consumers are likely to be familiar with and (2) represent a cross-
section of transactions in terms of subject matter, importance, and scope. 
Participants read about a scenario in which they were either deciding what 
to eat at a fancy restaurant, choosing a personal training package at the 
gym, purchasing their first new car, purchasing their first house, or deciding 
between different medical treatment options at the doctor’s office. Each par-
ticipant read only one of these scenarios, which the Qualtrics software 
chose for each participant randomly. 
Second, because of its relevance to the social psychology of trust, we 
manipulated the stakes involved in each of these five transactions.176 Half of 
the participants who were assigned to each financial transaction read either 
a “high stakes” version or a “low stakes” version of the transaction. Each of 
the high stakes and low stakes variations are discussed below. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 176 See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1. Participant Demographics177 
 % N 
Age (Median: 35.00) 
<30 
30–39 
40–49 
50–59 
60–81 
 
30.4 
30.3 
16.9 
13.9 
08.5 
 
255 
254 
142 
117 
71 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
48.5 
51.5 
 
408 
433 
Race 
Caucasian 
African American 
Hispanic 
Asian 
Other 
 
77.5 
08.0 
05.1 
07.5 
01.9 
 
652 
67 
43 
63 
16 
Education 
High School 
Some College 
College 
Master’s 
Ph.D. or Professional 
 
15.5 
32.5 
39.0 
10.3 
02.7 
 
130 
273 
54.5 
87 
23 
Political Affiliation 
Very Conservative 
Conservative 
Moderate 
Liberal 
Very Liberal 
 
05.4 
19.9 
26.3 
34.5 
14.0 
 
45 
165 
218 
286 
116 
Income 
Less than $30,000 
$30,000–$49,999 
$50,000–$69,999 
$70,000 or greater 
 
28.8 
26.9 
18.9 
25.3 
 
242 
226 
159 
213 
 
Participants assigned to the restaurant scenario had to choose between 
two entrees for themselves and their dinner companion. In both versions of 
this transaction, the participant was at a fancy restaurant and had to choose 
between two opaque-sounding entrees: either (1) “roasted swordfish with 
sage crispy sweetbread, braised lettuce burrata, Yukon gold potato tempura, 
and olive jus,” (the less expensive option) or (2) “roasted quail breast with 
                                                                                                                           
 177 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
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stewed peppers ‘Basquaise,’ Iberico ham, Yukon gold potato, and braising 
greens” (the more expensive option).178 
In all versions of the restaurant scenario, the participant’s dinner com-
panion insisted that the participant order for the table, because the participant 
had eaten at the restaurant in the past. In the low stakes version of the transac-
tion, participants were told that they were at the restaurant to celebrate their 
ten-year wedding anniversary with their partner. In the high stakes version, 
participants learned that they were at the restaurant on a first date with some-
one whom they had admired for some time and wanted to impress. 
In the personal training scenario, participants were told that they were 
examining training programs in connection with a New Year’s resolution to 
improve their health. After learning about the gym and the personal trainer, 
participants decided between two different packages. The study described 
the first package as medium intensity aerobic interval training (“MIAIT”) 
which involved a series of aerobic exercises performed at seventy-five per-
cent of the participants’ maximum heartrate mixed with lower-intensity ex-
ercise for a total of one hour. This package also included “periodic ‘hydro-
static weighing’” which the study described as “a modern procedure for 
determining a person’s body fat composition.” In contrast, the study de-
scribed the second option as high intensity anaerobic interval training 
(“HIAIT”) which involved shorter periods of more intense exercises using 
roughly eighty-five percent of the participant’s heart rate. This more expen-
sive package included fat monitoring via dual energy x-ray absorptiometry, 
or a “DEXA scan.”179 
In the low stakes condition, participants were told that they were gener-
ally in good health, but could use more cardiovascular training. In the high 
stakes condition, however, participants were told that they recently went to 
the doctor for a physical exam which revealed a genetic predisposition for 
several weight-related illnesses, including diabetes. Participants in the high 
stakes condition were told that the doctor recommended that they lose weight 
as soon as possible to reduce their likelihood of a serious health issue. 
Participants assigned to the new car scenario were told that they were 
walking into a car dealership to purchase their first new automobile. Partic-
                                                                                                                           
 178 Menu, DANIEL N.Y.C., https://www.danielnyc.com/menu [https://perma.cc/X97R-G5TW]. 
Both entrée options were taken from the online menu of the New York City restaurant, Daniel. Id. 
All participants were told that they (and their dinner companion) had the financial means to pay 
for both entrees, and that they had no foodborne allergies or other dietary restrictions. They were 
also told to imagine that they, and their dinner companion, do not have an aversion to either dish. 
 179 See generally Gordon Fisher et al., High Intensity Interval- vs Moderate Intensity- Train-
ing for Improving Cardiometabolic Health in Overweight or Obese Males: A Randomized Con-
trolled Trial, 10 PLOS ONE (2015) (providing information on HIAIT and MIAIT); DEXAFIT, https://
www.dexafit.com [https://perma.cc/N3MW-5EAU] (explaining the DEXA procedure and its un-
derlying science). 
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ipants were further told that they had already decided to purchase the same 
brand of car that they had enjoyed driving in the past, but they needed to 
choose between the base model or the more expensive luxury edition mod-
el. The base model was known to perform well, and came with several 
standard features, including air conditioning, automatic emergency brakes, 
head-up displays, and keyless entry. The luxury model, in addition to hav-
ing all of the features that composed the base model, included heated seats, 
a backup camera, automatic high beams, Bluetooth capability, lane-keeping 
assistance software, and elements that improve gas mileage and reduce car-
bon and nitrogen emissions. 
In the low stakes condition, participants were told that their personal 
finances were in excellent shape and that they had recently been promoted 
at work before their trip to the dealership. In the high stakes condition, 
however, participants learned that (1) their current car is no longer servicea-
ble after ten years of driving, (2) the purchase of a new car is critical to their 
work and family-related obligations, and (3) in light of recent news stories, 
there was some risk that the car manufacturer was misrepresenting the ni-
trogen and carbon emitted from its car, which could make the car un-
drivable and would require a cumbersome process to trade in the car for one 
that conforms to U.S. emissions standards. 
Participants assigned to the house purchase scenario were told that the 
bank had pre-approved them for a loan to purchase a house that was up to 
four times their annual income. The participants were told that they negoti-
ated down the price for their dream house, which ultimately was at the up-
per end of the acceptable range vis-à-vis the bank. All participants discov-
ered, to their dismay, that the closing costs were significantly higher than 
expected and that they would be required to pay an additional amount each 
month for mortgage insurance. In light of this information, participants had 
to decide whether to cancel the transaction (and forfeit their binder deposit) 
or continue with the financial transaction. 
 In the low stakes condition, participants were told that their current 
lease was flexible and could be extended until they found a financially suit-
able house to purchase. They were also told that several refinancing options 
would be available if they later had difficulty paying their mortgage. In the 
high stakes condition, however, participants were told that the lease for their 
current house was expiring at the end of the month (with no possibility of 
renewal) and that there would be few, if any, refinancing options in the 
event that they could not pay the mortgage. 
Participants assigned to the medical scenario learned that they had been 
diagnosed with a cancerous lesion on a non-vital organ. The doctor informed 
the participants that the lesion may spread to other parts of the body and lead 
to substantial complications. They were also told that it was possible, and 
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perhaps likely, that the lesion would not spread at all, and would therefore 
have no impact on their quality of life. Participants then had to choose wheth-
er to have surgery to remove the lesion or to wait one year and see if the le-
sion spreads (and if not, to continue that process each year). 
In the low stakes condition, participants learned that the doctor would 
be able to target the cells at the lesion in a minimally invasive outpatient 
procedure for a mildly significant cost, most of which would be paid by the 
participant’s insurance company. Participants also learned that there would 
be some uncomfortable side effects to the procedure, but that those side ef-
fects would dissipate within a few weeks. In contrast, in the high stakes 
condition, the doctor informed participants that it is impossible to target the 
cells at the lesion site, so the doctor prefers to remove the organ entirely. 
The procedure would be expensive (and only some of the costs would be 
defrayed through insurance), and the loss of the organ would require life-
long use of medication and months of recovery. 
Finally, we manipulated whether a seller-advisor was present or absent 
in these scenarios to examine the effect, if any, of the seller-advisor on par-
ticipants’ choices vis-à-vis the financial transaction. The scenarios that did 
not contain a seller-advisor therefore served as control conditions and pro-
vided the base rates for participants’ financial decisions in the absence of 
receiving advice regarding the two options available to them. When the 
seller-advisor was present, the experiment proceeded as follows: 
Table 2. Seller-Advisor Conditions in Part One180 
Scenario Relevant Text and Explanation 
Restaurant The seller-advisor took the form of the server, who 
told the participant that, in light of the “special occa-
sion” for the participant and the participant’s dinner 
companion, the quail option is better, because “[t]he 
difference [in taste] between [the two options] is 
well worth the difference in price.” 
Personal Training The seller-advisor took the form of the personal train-
er, who recommended the HIAIT program, noting that 
the participant will “see results more quickly with 
anaerobic training,” and that “the difference in results 
is well worth the difference in price.” 
  
                                                                                                                           
 180 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
Table 2 clarifies that the seller-advisor took the form of a server at a fancy restaurant, a personal 
trainer at a local gym, a salesperson at a used car dealership, a mortgage agent, or a surgeon de-
pending on the scenario to which we randomly assigned our participants. 
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Car Purchase The seller-advisor took the form of the car salesman, 
who recommended the luxury edition model because 
“the car manufacturer . . . has not had any problems 
with the EPA, and the difference in mileage (in the 
LE model) makes up for the difference in price with-
in five years.” 
House Purchase The mortgage agent served as the seller-advisor and 
recommended that the participant proceed with the 
transaction. The agent told the participant, “You’ll be 
fine . . . our data indicates that these are typical loan 
terms for someone in your financial position, and it’s 
clear that you love the house.” 
Medical The surgeon served as the seller-advisor and recom-
mended that the participant have the surgery: “I have 
had patients in the past who have had to make this 
decision . . . and I think having me perform the sur-
gery is the best option.” 
Notably, the seller-advisor always steered the participant toward the 
more expensive option, and the more expensive option always benefited the 
seller-advisor: the restaurant server would receive a higher tip on a more 
expensive bill, the personal trainer and car salesman would receive a higher 
commission on the more expensive product, the mortgage agent would re-
ceive a commission on the house if the participant did not cancel the trans-
action, and the doctor would be paid the cost of the surgery that he per-
formed if the participant decided not to “wait and see.” 
Moreover, most of the seller-advisors—notably the server, the trainer, 
the car salesman, and the mortgage agent—owe no legally recognized fidu-
ciary duty to act in the best interest of the participant, and therefore owe no 
duty to disclose their potentially hidden financial interest.181 Additionally, 
although doctors generally owe certain fiduciary duties to their patients, 
those duties do not necessarily require doctors to disclose all financial inter-
ests that they might have in a course of action that they recommend to pa-
tients.182 
In sum, we manipulated three variables in this experiment: the type of 
transaction to which participants were exposed (restaurant, personal training, 
car purchase, house purchase, or medical decision), the stakes involved in that 
transaction (either high or low), and the presence or absence of a seller-
advisor, who always, to his benefit, recommended the more expensive option. 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See supra notes 83–99 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text. 
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After our participants read the scenario to which they were randomly 
assigned, we asked them several questions about the financial transaction. 
On seven-point Likert scales, we asked participants to rate the significance 
of the decision they made, along with the complexity of the scenario (from 
“insignificant”/“not complex” to “highly significant”/“highly complex”).183 
We also asked participants, on the same seven-point scale, to rate their pref-
erence for the less-expensive option and for the more-expensive option 
(from “very little” to “very much”). Finally, we asked participants to choose 
between the less-expensive and more-expensive options. 
We also asked participants four questions to determine their level of trust 
in the seller-advisor (if a seller-advisor was present in the scenario that they 
read). In accordance with the elements of trust that we identified in our re-
view of the literature, we asked participants to rate the seller-advisor’s 
knowledge of the options presented compared to the participants’ own 
knowledge (“ability”), the seller-advisor’s general competency (also “abil-
ity”), the level of respect that participants afforded the seller-advisor (“integri-
ty”), and how much they trusted the seller-advisor’s recommendation (“be-
nevolence”).184 
Finally, we asked participants several demographic questions. We asked 
participants to record their age, gender, race/ethnicity, highest level of educa-
tion completed, household annual income, and political orientation. We also 
asked participants if they had a personal experience with the subject matter 
that they had read about. Afterward, we thanked the participants, debriefed 
them with respect to the study hypotheses, and concluded the experiment. 
C. Results and Discussion 
This section proceeds in three parts. First, it reports the results of the 
preliminary analyses of the study with respect to our independent and de-
pendent variables.185 Second, it reports the main results of this study: 
whether the type of financial transaction to which the participants were ex-
posed, the stakes of that transaction, and whether the presence of a seller-
advisor during the transaction independently affected participants’ financial 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 145 (2d ed. 2016) (de-
scribing a Likert Scale as a psychometric scale that is routinely used in questionnaires and ana-
lyzed as an ordinal variable frequently ranging from one to seven); Saul McLeod, Likert Scale, 
SIMPLY PSYCHOL. (2008), http://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale html [https://perma.cc/
4HH8-QT8U] (noting that the Likert Scale is the most widely used measure of attitudes in survey 
research and that they “allow for degrees of opinion,” permitting the researcher to collect quantitative 
data); see also James Carifio & Rocco J. Perla, Ten Common Misunderstandings, Misconceptions, 
Persistent Myths and Urban Legends About Likert Scales and Likert Response Formats and Their 
Antidotes, 3 J. SOC. SCI. 106, 113 (2007) (refuting common misconceptions of Likert Scales). 
 184 See supra notes 138–156 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 188–201 and accompanying text.  
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choices.186 Third, to the extent that the mere presence of a seller-advisor 
influenced participants’ financial choices, we performed a mediation analy-
sis to determine whether, and to what extent, participants’ financial choices 
can be attributed to their level of trust in the seller-advisor.187 
1. Preliminary Matters 
Our preliminary analyses focused on three questions. First, we claim to 
have manipulated the stakes of the financial transaction to which partici-
pants were exposed. In this section, we perform a “manipulation check,” in 
which we demonstrate empirically that our participants did, in fact, perceive 
the high stakes and low stakes scenarios as differentially important.188 
Second, in addition to having participants choose between two com-
peting financial options, and asking participants to rate their preference for 
those options on two seven-point scales, we asked participants four ques-
tions to determine their level of trust in the seller-advisor (if they were ran-
domly assigned to an experimental condition in which a seller-advisor was 
present). In this part of the study we show, statistically, that those four ques-
tions all measured the same latent psychological trait (trust), and that these 
questions measured trust reliably. We now turn to these analyses. 
To determine whether participants perceived the high stakes and low 
stakes conditions as differentially important across all five scenarios in this 
experiment, we examined the effect of our “stakes” variable on our “im-
portance” variable through a one-way analysis of variance (“ANOVA”).189 
The analysis revealed that participants did in fact perceive the high stakes 
conditions as meaningfully more important than the low stakes conditions 
across all financial scenarios.190 The manipulation was therefore successful. 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See infra notes 202–210 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 212–223 and accompanying text. 
 188 See generally Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detect-
ing Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) 
(explaining the concept of a “manipulation check”). 
 189 As Justin Sevier explained when discussing the use of analysis of variance in another orig-
inal study: 
An analysis of variance (“ANOVA”) provides a statistical test of whether the means 
of several groups are equal. ANOVA results are represented by an F-statistic, and 
the sizes of the effects are represented by η2p. Means are denoted by the letter “M” 
and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.” Differences are denoted as 
“statistically significant” in this Article if the statistical tests indicate that the likeli-
hood that the difference observed would occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated 
by the p-value as p < 0.05). A difference is “marginally significant” if the likelihood 
of seeing such a difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. 
Justin Sevier, Vicarious Windfalls, 102 IOWA L. REV. 651, 677 n.102 (2017) (citation omitted). 
 190 Mlow = 5.38 (SD = 1.58), Mhigh = 5.64 (SD = 1.37); F(1, 840) = 6.22, p = .013, η2p = .01. 
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The analysis was more complex to determine whether our four ques-
tions, intended to measure the participants’ trusts in their seller-advisor, in 
fact measured trust and did so reliably. To make this determination, we per-
formed two different tests. First, we performed a principal components ex-
ploratory factor analysis, with an oblique rotation, on participants’ respons-
es to the four questions regarding the seller-advisor to which they were ex-
posed.191 The analysis confirmed that the four questions that purportedly 
measured participants’ trust in their seller-advisor also measured the same 
underlying latent trait—trust—and together explained 75.7% of the vari-
ance in our participants’ responses.192 In other words, the factor analysis 
suggested that a significant amount of the variation in how our participants’ 
answered these four questions is accounted for by just one psychological 
trait. And based on the substance of those questions in light of the psychol-
ogy literature, we believe that the underlying trait is trust.193 
Consistent with prevailing practices in experimental psychology, we 
therefore averaged our participants’ responses to these four questions to-
gether to form our “trust” index measure. A subsequent analysis revealed 
that our trust index measure was highly reliable, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of 0.89.194 The results of the exploratory factor analysis appear below. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 191 See generally Harold Hotelling, Analysis of a Complex of Statistical Variables into Princi-
pal Components, 24 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 498 (1933) (explaining the tenets of a principal compo-
nent analysis and the meaning of an oblique factor rotation). 
 192 See id. (explaining that the factors in a principal component analysis are meaningful if 
their statistical “eigenvalues” are greater than one). The eigenvalue associated with the four trust 
questions was 3.03. 
 193 See supra notes 130–166 and accompanying text. 
 194 See generally Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 
PSYCHOMETRIKA 297 (1951) (describing the concept of the coefficient alpha and corresponding 
tests). The reliability of a psychometric scale is measured by a Cronbach’s alpha statistic ranging 
from zero (lowest reliability) to one (highest reliability). J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, 
Cronbach’s Alpha, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 572, 572 (1997). Stated differently, a Cronbach’s alpha 
value “is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a 
group” or how well a test measures what it purports to measure. What Does Cronbach’s Alpha 
Mean?, UCLA INST. DIGITAL RES. & EDUC., https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/spss/faq/what-does-
cronbachs-alpha-mean/ [https://perma.cc/PDD9-TJDQ]. 
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Table 3. Total Variance Explained195 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Loadings 
Component 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
3.03 
0.57 
0.25 
0.16 
Variance 
75.70 
14.14 
6.13 
4.03 
Cum. % 
75.70 
89.84 
95.97 
100.00 
Total 
3.03 
Variance 
75.70 
Cum. % 
75.70 
Individual Items Trust Index 
How would you rate the [advisor’s] knowledge of [the subject matter]? 
How competent do you believe the [advisor] is? 
To what degree did you respect the [advisor’s] advice? 
How much did you trust the [advisor’s] recommendation? 
0.79 
0.90 
0.92 
0.86 
 
Finally, we examined whether specific factors—including the perceived 
complexity of the financial transaction and the perceived significance of the 
transaction—affected people’s willingness to trust their seller-advisors. If 
these factors independently predict our participants’ trust levels—and if the 
level of perceived complexity and perceived significance differs in each of 
our scenarios—we must control for these factors in our behavioral model of 
the relationship between people’s trust in their seller-advisors and the finan-
cial choices that they make.196 We turn to this analysis below.197 
To determine whether the type of financial transaction to which our 
participants were exposed affected (1) their perceptions of the importance 
of the transaction and (2) their perceptions of the complexity of the transac-
tion, we performed a multivariate analysis of variance (“MANOVA”) on 
both of these dependent variables, with “transaction type” as the independ-
ent variable.198 The analysis revealed a statistically significant difference 
                                                                                                                           
 195 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
Table 3 shows that just one latent trait (of five possible latent traits) was statistically meaningful 
and accounted for three-quarters of the variance in participants’ responses to our four items. Those 
four items loaded onto a reliable “trust” scale, with loadings ranging from 0.79 to 0.92. 
 196 These control variables are termed “covariates,” and an analysis that includes these covari-
ates would be termed an analysis of co-variance (“ANCOVA”) which is a close cousin of the 
ANOVA linear model. See generally Andrew C. Porter & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Analysis of 
Covariance: Its Model and Use in Psychological Research, 34 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 383 
(1987) (describing covariance analysis). 
 197 See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. 
 198 See generally Russell T. Warne, A Primer on Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANO-
VA) for Behavioral Scientists, 19 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION 1 (Nov. 2014), http://
pareonline net/pdf/v19n17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G7V-J2KA] (describing the multivariate analy-
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with respect to the importance of our five transactions.199 Specifically, par-
ticipants found the new car scenario, the new house scenario, and the sur-
gery scenario more significant than the restaurant scenario and the personal 
training scenario.200 We found a similar, statistically significant pattern of 
results with respect to participants’ perceptions of the complexity of the 
transactions.201 We therefore added to the model as control variables the 
perceived importance and perceived complexity of the financial transactions 
to which participants were exposed in our experiment. 
2. Main Analysis 
This section proceeds in two parts. First, we examined the type of finan-
cial transaction, the stakes of the transaction, and the presence or absence of a 
seller-advisor on consumers’ financial decision making.202 Second, in the ex-
perimental conditions, where a seller-advisor was present, we examined (1) 
whether the role of the financial transaction and stakes of the transaction af-
fected consumers’ trust in the seller-advisor and (2) the extent to which con-
sumers’ trust in the seller-advisor explained their financial choices.203 
First, we evaluated our experimental hypotheses regarding consumers’ 
financial decisions. Controlling for several variables, we predicted the fol-
lowing. First, we predicted that certain financial transactions would cause 
participants to choose the expensive option more often than in other finan-
cial transactions. Second, although we were unsure of the direction of the 
difference, we expected that the stakes of the transaction would cause par-
ticipants to differentially choose the more expensive option (although it is 
perhaps more likely that they would become more conservative in high 
stakes situations). Third, and most importantly, we predicted that (1) the 
mere presence of a seller-advisor, who recommends that participants choose 
the more expensive option which also benefits the seller-advisor, would 
cause participants to more often choose the more expensive option; and (2) 
                                                                                                                           
sis of variance (“MANOVA”) technique). MANOVA is a special type of analysis of variance 
where multiple dependent variables—which are at least moderately correlated—are analyzed in 
tandem to reduce the likelihood of false positives (“type I error”). Id. 
 199 F(4, 832) = 108.75, p < .001, η2p = .34. 
 200 The means for the perceived importance of each financial scenario were as follows: Mrestaurant 
= 4.17 (SD = 0.09), Mtrainer = 4.90 (SD = 0.09), Mcar = 5.71 (SD = 0.09), Mhouse = 6.54 (SD = 0.09), 
Msurgery = 6.21 (SD = 0.09). 
 201 F(4, 832) = 59.11, p < .001, η2p = .22. The means for the perceived complexity of each 
scenario were as follows: Mrestaurant = 3.42 (SD = 0.12), Mtrainer = 4.11 (SD = 0.12), Mcar = 4.23 (SD 
= 0.11), Mhouse = 5.42 (SD = 0.11), Msurgery = 5.45 (SD = 0.12). Our importance and complexity 
dependent measures were moderately correlated: r(835) = .55, p < .001. 
 202 See infra notes 204–210 and accompanying text. 
 203 See infra notes 204–223 and accompanying text. 
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this effect would be stronger than the hypothesized conservative effect pro-
duced in relation to the stakes of the financial transaction. 
To test these hypotheses empirically, we conducted a logistic regres-
sion analysis204 including the following model specifications: (1) the type of 
transaction, stakes of the transaction, and presence or absence of a seller-
advisor as the independent (predictor) variables; (2) the perceived im-
portance and complexity of the transaction as covariates (to serve as con-
trols); and (3) the participants’ financial choice—either the cheaper or more 
expensive option—as the dependent (response) variable. 
The results confirmed our hypotheses. First, we found a significant and 
strong effect on participants’ willingness to choose the more expensive fi-
nancial option based on the type of transaction they engaged in.205 Specifi-
cally, participants were more willing than not to choose the more expensive 
entrée at the restaurant and the luxury edition vehicle, regardless of the 
presence or absence of a seller-advisor. Participants were more evenly split 
between the cheaper and expensive options in the personal training, house 
purchase, and surgery scenarios. A graph illustrating participants’ choices in 
each financial scenario appears below. 
Chart 1206
 
                                                                                                                           
 204 A logistic regression is a regression analysis that examines whether several variables inde-
pendently predict a binary, dichotomous outcome, such as a guilty or not guilty verdict. See LAW-
LESS ET AL., supra note 183, at 298–303 (discussing logistic regressions). Statistical significance 
in a logistic regression model is determined by a “Wald” statistic and its corresponding p-value. 
Viv Bewick et al., Statistics Review 14: Logistic Regression, 9 CRITICAL CARE 112, 114 (2005). 
The logistic regression model also produces an “exponential(B)” statistic, which is an odds ratio. 
Exponential(B) values above one represent heightened odds (for example, an exponential(B) value 
of two represents a doubling of the odds), whereas values below one represent decreased odds. 
 205 Wald = 39.21, p < .001. 
 206 This Chart is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
Chart 1 shows that 76% of participants in the car condition chose the expensive option, as did 
63.6% of participants in the restaurant condition, 48.5% of participants in the house condition, 
47.9% of participants in the trainer condition, and 45.2% of participants in the surgery condition. 
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Second, we found a statistically significant—but weaker—effect on 
participants’ likelihood of choosing the more expensive option based on the 
stakes of the transaction. Specifically, participants were less likely to choose 
the expensive option—that is, exhibited greater conservatism—when the 
stakes of the transaction were higher than when they were lower.207 Across 
all financial scenarios, this conservatism effect reduced the likelihood of 
participants choosing the more expensive option by roughly twenty-two 
percent.208 
Finally, and most importantly, we found a statistically significant effect 
on participants’ likelihood of choosing the seller-advisor-preferred, more 
expensive option, whenever a seller-advisor was present.209 Specifically, the 
mere presence of the seller-advisor increased the likelihood that participants 
would choose the option that the seller-advisor recommended by roughly 
forty-three percent, and this effect was stronger than the conservative effect 
exhibited with the degree of the stakes of the transaction.210 
Notably the effect of the seller-advisor’s presence caused an increase 
in participants’ likelihood of choosing the more expensive option in each 
financial scenario, although the effect was not uniform. The seller-advisor 
had a relatively small effect on participants’ choices in the house and car 
purchase scenarios. The seller-advisor’s impact was stronger, however, in 
the restaurant, surgery, and personal training scenarios. Indeed, the mere 
presence of the seller-advisor caused a shift in overall preference in the per-
sonal training scenario, away from a preference for the cheaper option and 
toward a preference for the more expensive, seller-advisor-preferred option. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 207 B = -0.25, SE = 0.15, Wald = 2.84, p = .092 (marginal), exponential(B) = 0.78 (odds ratio). 
 208 For example, in the surgery scenario, 57.8% of participants in the low stakes condition 
elected to have the more expensive option (surgery). That percentage fell to 32.9% of participants 
in the high stakes condition. 
 209 B = 0.36, SE = 0.15, Wald = 5.50, p = .019, exponential(B) = 1.43 (odds ratio). 
 210 For example, in the personal training scenario, participants chose the more expensive 
training package just 33.9% of the time when they were not exposed to a seller-advisor. In con-
trast, 55% of participants exposed to a seller-advisor chose the seller-advisor’s preferred, more 
expensive, option. Participants chose the more expensive, seller-advisor-preferred option by 10.4 
points in the restaurant condition, 21.1 points in the trainer condition, 2.2 points in the car condi-
tion, 0.3 points in the house condition, and 7 points in the surgery condition. 
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To test these hypotheses, we first compared the mean trust ratings for 
participants in our sample with the midpoint of the trust scale. Next, we 
conducted a main effects analysis of co-variance (“ANCOVA”) in which we 
included (1) the type of transaction and stakes of the transaction as the in-
dependent variables, (2) the perceived importance and complexity of the 
transaction as covariates, and (3) the scores on the trust index as the de-
pendent variable. We then examined the bivariate correlation between the 
participants’ choices and their trust in their seller-advisor.212 
The results supported our hypotheses. The mean rating on our trust in-
dex was 5.23 out of 7. A one-sample t-test revealed that this rating was sta-
tistically different from the lowest point of the scale (1)213 and was statisti-
cally different from the mid-point of the scale (4) as well.214 This indicates, 
consistent with past literature on the psychology of trust, that participants 
generally trusted their seller-advisor in the financial transaction to which 
they were exposed.215 
Additionally, as with participants’ financial choices, we found a strong 
and significant effect on participants’ trust in their seller-advisor based on 
the type of transaction, such that the car salesman and the mortgage agent 
were deemed less trustworthy than the agents in the other financial scenari-
os.216 We also found a weaker, but statistically significant, effect on partici-
pants’ trust in their seller-advisor based on the stakes of the transaction, 
such that participants viewed the seller-advisor in the high stakes condition 
as less trustworthy than the seller-advisor in the low stakes condition.217 
Finally, and most importantly, an examination of the bivariate correla-
tion between participants’ trust scores and their ultimate financial decision 
revealed a moderately strong and statistically significant relationship be-
tween participants’ trust in the seller-advisor, across all scenarios, and their 
likelihood of choosing the seller-advisor’s preferred option.218 
In four of the five scenarios, the correlation between participants’ trust 
in the seller-advisor and their willingness to choose the seller-advisor’s pre-
                                                                                                                           
 212 Bivariate correlations range from negative one (a perfect negative relationship) to positive 
one (a perfect positive relationship). See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
425–29 (14th ed. 2016). A bivariate correlation of zero indicates no relationship. Id. 
 213 M = 5.23, SD = 1.24. t(556) = 80.37, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.41. A one-sample t-test is a 
parametric technique that “determines whether the sample mean is statistically different from a 
known or hypothesized population mean.” SPSS Tutorials: One-Sample t-Test, KENT ST. U. LI-
BRARIES, https://libguides.library.kent.edu/SPSS/OneSampletTest [https://perma.cc/6SLX-LSP6]. 
 214 M = 5.23, SD = 1.24. t(556) = 23.38, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.99. 
 215 See supra notes 130–166 and accompanying text. 
 216 F(4, 548) = 47.41, p < .001, η2p = .26. The means for the level of trust vis-à-vis the seller-
advisor in each scenario are as follows: Mrestaurant = 5.95 (SE = 0.11), Mtrainer = 5.52 (SE = 0.11), 
Mcar = 4.72 (SE = 0.10), Mhouse = 4.18 (SE = 0.11), Msurgery = 5.80 (SE = 0.11). 
 217 Mlow = 5.33 (SE = 0.07), Mhigh = 5.14 (SE = 0.07), F(1, 548) = 4.36, p = .037, η2p = .01. 
 218 Pearson’s r(550) = .29, p < .001. 
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ferred option was moderate to strong.219 Extrapolating from these bivariate 
correlations, we also determined the percentage of the variance in people’s 
financial choices that were explained through their trust in their seller-
advisor. Participants’ level of trust in their seller-advisor explained twenty 
percent of their financial decision in the restaurant, house purchase, and 
surgery scenarios. Trust levels accounted for ten percent of the variance in 
the car purchase scenario.220 
Chart 3221 
 
In sum, the results from Part One of our study provide substantial sup-
port for our hypotheses regarding the role of seller-advisors and the role of 
trust in consumers’ decisions across a spectrum of commonplace financial 
scenarios. Consumers’ willingness to choose a more expensive financial 
option versus a cheaper option vary widely across differing financial sce-
                                                                                                                           
 219 In the restaurant scenario, the bivariate correlation was 0.47 (p < .001); in the car purchase 
scenario, it was 0.3 (p = .001); in the new house scenario, it was 0.46 (p < .001); in the surgery 
scenario, it was 0.44 (p < .001). The trainer scenario was the only scenario in which the correla-
tion was unreliable (p = .195), and the bivariate correlation between perceived trust scores and 
consumer choice was 0.12. 
 220 Specifically, and as Chart 3 illustrates, the r2 values for each experimental condition are as 
follows: 0.22 for the restaurant condition, 0.21 for the house condition, 0.19 for the surgery condi-
tion, 0.09 for the car condition, and 0.01 for the trainer condition. The figures in the graph repre-
sent r2values. The r2statistic represents the amount of the variance in the dependent variable that is 
entirely attributable to the independent variable. r2 values range from zero (no explanatory power) 
to one (perfect explanatory power). 
 221 This Chart is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
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narios. They become predictably more conservative, however, when the 
stakes of the financial transaction are high. 
More importantly, the mere presence of a seller-advisor increases the 
likelihood that participants will choose the financial option recommended to 
them by the seller-advisor, even when the seller-advisor’s recommendation is 
motivated by a financial interest that is independent from the interests of the 
consumer. Subsequent analyses revealed that this seller-advisor effect is not 
simply a matter of coldly deferring to the expertise of the seller-advisor; a 
substantial amount of the variance in consumers’ financial choices in our 
study is attributable—independently and explicitly—to the trust they felt to-
wards their seller-advisor. These findings are host to an array of potential pol-
icy implications for the relationships between seller-advisors and consumers 
in the marketplace, which we discuss at the conclusion of this Article.222 
Part One of this study leaves several questions unanswered. For exam-
ple, what might be the effect, if any, of the disclosure of a seller-advisor’s 
financial interest in the option that the seller-advisor recommends to a con-
sumer? Moreover, does the source of that disclosure—either through the 
seller-advisor or a third party—affect consumers’ levels of trust in the sell-
er-advisor and, ultimately, the financial choices that they make? Part Two of 
our study examines these questions.223 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: PART TWO 
Two questions formed the basis of Part Two of our study. Recall that 
the mere presence of a seller-advisor in Part One increased the likelihood 
that consumers would choose the seller-advisor’s preferred financial prod-
uct.224 Also recall that the seller-advisor preferred that financial product be-
cause the product allowed the seller-advisor to earn an economic benefit, 
compared to the disfavored option.225 It is an open question (1) whether 
consumers would trust the seller-advisor if the seller-advisor disclosed his 
or her financial interest at the time of the transaction; and (2) whether the 
disclosure would affect the consumers’ financial decisions. On the one 
hand, we can imagine that consumers will realize that the seller-advisor’s 
recommendation stems from the seller-advisor’s independent financial in-
terest, and the consumer will be less inclined to follow the seller-advisor’s 
advice. On the other hand, we can imagine that the seller-advisor’s disclo-
sure may make consumers more likely to trust the seller-advisor’s advice 
and follow their recommendation, on account of the seller-advisor’s candor. 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See infra notes 248–291 and accompanying text. 
 223 See infra notes 224–245 and accompanying text. 
 224 See supra notes 209–210 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
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Second, it is unclear whether the disclosure of the seller-advisor’s fi-
nancial interest in the transaction must come from the seller-advisor or if it 
only matters that the consumer receives the information, regardless of its 
source. To the extent that the seller-advisor fails to disclose his or her finan-
cial interest, consumers might view that as a violation of the relationship of 
trust and confidence that they believe they hold with the seller-advisor. A 
third-party’s disclosure of that financial interest might, therefore, cause con-
sumers to switch their financial preferences accordingly. If this is so, we 
expect that decreased levels of trust in the seller-advisor would be responsi-
ble for consumers’ changed financial preferences. Our methods for testing 
these hypotheses and the results from Part Two of this study appear below. 
A. Participants 
Part Two of this study is composed of data collected from a subset of 
the participants from Part One. Participants were, therefore, also recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and completed the study through the 
online Qualtrics survey platform.226 
The subset of participants whose data is reported in Part Two totaled 
558 people. Females composed 49.1% of the subset, and the average age of 
participants was 38.88 years old (with a standard deviation of 12.91 years). 
Caucasian participants composed 77.8% of the subset, followed by African-
American (8.5%), Asian-American (7.2%), Hispanic (4.7%), and “other” 
(1.8%). Approximately 52.6% of the sample had obtained at least a college 
degree, and the median household income was between $40,000 and 
$49,999. Forty-four percent of the sample had experience with the financial 
scenario that they encountered in this study. 
B. Procedure and Measures 
Because the data we analyze in Part Two is a subset of the data from 
Part One of this study, the procedures and measures were largely the 
same.227 The participants in Part Two were randomly assigned to the “seller-
advisor present” conditions of the original experiment. We created two ad-
ditional sub-variables for participants assigned to the seller-advisor condi-
tions, which we discuss below. 
First, we manipulated the transparency of the seller-advisor’s independ-
ent financial interest in his or her recommendation to the consumer. In the 
opaque conditions—to which half of the participants in the seller-advisor 
condition were assigned randomly—consumers received no information re-
                                                                                                                           
 226 See supra note 173–175 and accompanying text. 
 227 See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. 
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garding the seller-advisor’s potential conflict of interest. In the transparent 
conditions, however, the seller-advisor disclosed the conflict when giving his 
or her recommendation. For example, in the restaurant scenario, the server 
clarified that he or she would recommend the more expensive quail dish an-
yway, “even if [he or she] would not receive a higher tip because of the in-
creased price of the meal.” 228 Participants then followed the procedure out-
lined for Part One.229 Participants chose between the two financial options, 
rated their preferences for them, and recorded their trust in the seller-advisor. 
We subjected participants who were randomly assigned to the opaque 
conditions, however, to one more experimental manipulation. After the partic-
ipants received a recommendation from the seller-advisor, who did not dis-
close their financial interest, and rated their preferences for each financial 
option, participants read text which revealed the seller-advisor’s incentive, 
but from someone other than the seller-advisor. For example, in the restaurant 
scenario, participants were told to imagine that, a few days later, they were 
casually discussing the dinner and their entrée choice with a friend who re-
marked, “[t]hat’s a tough choice. I guess the server has an incentive to rec-
ommend the expensive dish, since the resulting tip would be higher.” 
All participants in the opaque conditions were then asked, “in light of 
this conversation,” which financial option they would choose, their prefer-
ence for each option, and their level of trust in the seller-advisor. All partic-
ipants were then debriefed regarding the experimental hypotheses and the 
study was concluded. A chart of the experimental language in the transpar-
ent and opaque conditions appears below. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 228 Table 4 provides the text of each transparent and opaque condition scenario. See infra note 
230 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. 
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Table 4. Incentive Disclosure Conditions in Part Two230 
Scenario Transparent Opaque (Third-Party Reveal) 
Restaurant “I’ve had both dishes,” the server 
says. “The difference between 
them is worth the difference in 
price. I’d recommend it even if I 
would not receive a higher tip be-
cause of the increased price of the 
meal.” 
Your friend remarks, “That’s 
a tough choice. I guess the 
server has an incentive to 
recommend the more expen-
sive dish, since the resulting 
tip would be higher.” 
Trainer “I’ve been through both pro-
grams,” the trainer says. “The dif-
ference in results is well worth the 
difference in price. I’d recommend 
it for you even if it were the cheap-
er option and I’d get paid less.” 
Your friend remarks, “That’s 
a tough choice. I guess the 
trainer has an incentive to 
recommend the more expen-
sive package, because the 
difference in price gets paid 
directly to the trainer.” 
Car “I’ve driven both cars,” says the 
salesperson . . . . “The difference in 
mileage makes up for the differ-
ence in price within five years. I’d 
recommend the LE to you even if I 
weren’t receiving a higher com-
mission from the sale.” 
Your friend remarks, “That’s 
a tough choice. I guess the 
salesperson has an incentive 
to recommend the luxury 
model, since the price differ-
ence would result in a higher 
commission.” 
House “It’s clear you love the house,” 
says the mortgage agent . . . . “I 
would make the same recommen-
dation to you even if I weren’t re-
ceiving a commission when you 
complete the purchase.” 
Your friend remarks, “That’s 
a tough choice. I guess the 
mortgage agent has an incen-
tive to recommend that you 
purchase the house, since the 
agent gets paid on commis-
sion.” 
Surgery “I think having me perform the 
surgery is the best option,” says the 
doctor. “I would make this recom-
mendation to you even if someone 
else performed the surgery, and I 
did not get paid for it.” 
Your friend remarks, “That’s 
a tough choice. I guess the 
doctor has an incentive to 
recommend the surgery, since 
the doctor would perform it 
and get paid for it.” 
                                                                                                                           
 230 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
The relevant information that participants learned, as shown in Table 4, is as follows: (1) the res-
taurant server receives a higher tip if the more expensive entrée is selected, (2) the personal trainer 
receives greater compensation if the more expensive training package is selected, (3) the car 
salesperson receives a higher commission if the more expensive car is selected, (4) the mortgage 
agent receives a commission only if the house purchase is completed, and (5) the surgeon has an 
incentive to recommend the surgery because he or she would perform it and receive payment for 
it. The seller-advisor revealed the incentive to the participant in the “transparent” condition; a 
friend of the participant revealed the incentive in the “opaque” condition. 
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C. Results and Discussion 
We report the results of three different tests in Part Two of the study. 
First, we examined whether any differences exist with respect to the finan-
cial decisions of the participants in the transparency condition and those in 
the opaque condition, before they learned of the seller-advisor’s financial 
interest. Second, examining only participants in the opaque condition, we 
examined whether any meaningful differences exist between consumers’ 
financial decisions before they learned of the seller-advisor’s financial in-
centive and after a third party revealed it to them. Finally, to the extent that 
meaningful differences exist between the financial decisions of the partici-
pants in the opaque conditions before and after they learned of the seller-
advisor’s conflict of interest, we examined whether consumers’ level of 
trust in the seller-advisor attributes to the shift in financial preference. 
We first examined, controlling for the perceived importance and com-
plexity of the transaction, whether the transparency of the seller-advisor’s 
conflict of interest affected participants’ financial choices or their trust in 
the seller-advisor. Somewhat surprisingly, we found no meaningful differ-
ences in consumer choices231 or in their trust in the seller-advisor.232 This 
may suggest that mere disclosure by the seller-advisor will not, by itself, 
lead consumers to trust the seller-advisor more and choose the seller-
advisor’s preferred financial product more often. Conversely, it may also 
mean that consumers do not “punish” self-interested seller-advisors, either 
by trusting them less or failing to follow their recommendations, because 
they are not aware of the seller-advisor’s potential conflict. 
As a result of this ambiguity in our results, we next examined how 
consumers behave when a third party reveals the seller-advisor’s conflict of 
interest. The post-choice disclosure of the seller-advisor’s financial incen-
tive by a third party caused a ten percent net movement in consumer choic-
es toward the cheaper financial option, which was not recommended by the 
seller-advisor.233 This effect was trending toward significance in our sample 
of consumers.234 
                                                                                                                           
 231 B = 0.04, SE = 0.18, Wald = 0.04, p = .834, exponential(B) = 1.04 (odds ratio). Compared 
to participants in the transparent condition, participants in the opaque condition were 4% more 
likely to choose the advisor’s preferred financial option. This (small) observed effect, however, 
was statistically unreliable. 
 232 Mopaque = 5.26 (SE = 0.08), Mtransparent = 5.20 (SE = 0.07); F(1, 552) = 0.28, p = .600, η2p = 0. 
 233 Unlike our previous statistical tests, which examined how different participants responded 
to our experimental manipulations (referred to as a “between-subjects” design), this portion of our 
study examines changes over time in the responses given by the same participants, which is re-
ferred to as a “within-subjects” design. 
 234 χ2(1) = 2.31, p = .12. In this chi-square “goodness of fit” test, we tested the proportion of 
participants’ post-disclosure choices against the proportion of pre-disclosure financial choices to 
determine whether the post-disclosure proportions meaningfully differed from participants’ pre-
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Chart 4235 
 
We also tested whether any differences emerged regarding consumers’ 
willingness to trust the seller-advisor again. A repeated measures analysis of 
variance, comparing participants’ willingness to trust the seller-advisor 
again in the future before the incentive was revealed with their willingness 
to do so after a third party disclosed the incentive, revealed a significant 
drop in consumers’ trust in the seller-advisor after the third-party disclosure 
of the incentive compared to beforehand. Specifically, participants appeared 
to trust the seller-advisor highly when the seller-advisor’s conflict of inter-
est remained opaque, but those trust levels regressed toward the midpoint of 
the scale after the third-party disclosure of the conflict.236 The graph below 
illustrates the participants’ willingness to trust the seller-advisor both before 
and after the third-party disclosure of the seller-advisor’s financial interest 
in each of the five scenarios. 
  
                                                                                                                           
disclosure choices. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 183, at 210–15. Although consumers’ shift in 
preferences did not reach statistical significance as it is conventionally defined (p < .05), it came 
close to reaching marginal significance, as it is defined in the statistical literature (p < .10). If the 
null hypothesis were true (that there was no change in consumers’ financial decisions as a result of 
the third party’s disclosure of the seller-advisor’s incentive), we would see the results that we 
found in our study just twelve times out of every one hundred studies. This suggests, unsurprising-
ly, that the newly disclosed information affected our participants’ financial choices partially but 
not entirely. As we demonstrate later in this Article, however, the newly disclosed information did 
negatively affect our participants’ stated preferences for the financial option favored by the seller-
advisor. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 235 This Chart is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
 236 Mopaque = 4.91 (SE = 0.10), Mtransparent = 4.54 (SE = 0.10); F(1, 267) = 36.54, p < .001, η2p = .12. 
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erences then manifest themselves in the financial choices that our partici-
pants made, in which a subset of our participants, upon reflection, chose the 
financial option that was not recommended by the seller-advisor.239 
Chart 6240 
 
 
The mediation analysis supports our hypothesis that lowered levels of 
trust toward the seller-advisor were the mediating factor in our study. The 
mediation first demonstrated a statistically significant difference between 
consumers’ preferences for the seller-advisor-preferred, more expensive, 
financial option before they learned of the seller-advisor’s conflict of inter-
est and their preferences for that option after they learned of it.241 Specifi-
cally, participants preferred the more expensive option significantly less 
after learning of the seller-advisor’s conflict of interest. Next, the analysis 
demonstrated that consumers’ willingness to trust the seller-advisor in the 
future differed depending on whether they had been made aware of the sell-
er-advisor’s conflict.242 Consumers were significantly more willing to trust 
the seller-advisor again before a third party revealed the seller-advisor’s 
conflict than they were afterward. 
Importantly, we found that, when we included the change in partici-
pants’ trust ratings, vis-à-vis the seller-advisor, into the model in which we 
examined the change in participants’ preferences for the more expensive 
financial option, we found that (1) a change in trust levels was a statistically 
significant predictor of the change in consumer preferences; and (2) the ef-
                                                                                                                           
 239 We performed a special type of mediation analysis called a “repeated measures” or “within 
subjects” mediation, which applies the typical mediation analysis to responses made by the same 
experimental participants over time during the study. Amanda K. Montoya & Andrew F. Hayes, 
Two-Condition Within-Participant Statistical Mediation Analysis: A Path-Analytic Framework, 22 
PSYCHOL. METHODS 6, 6–7 (2017) (explaining the procedure and placing it in the context of the 
traditional mediation analysis). 
 240 This Chart is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/sevier-williams-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/P667-7XA9]. 
 241 B = 0.28, SE = 0.08, t(263) = 3.74, p < .001, CI [0.13, 0.43]. 
 242 B = -0.38, SE = 0.06, t(263) = 6.07, p < .001, CI [0.26, 0.50]. 
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fect of the change in preferences was reduced by 0.1 (from 0.28 to 0.18).243 
This is a reduction of the effect by 35.7%. We can conclude, therefore, that 
lowered feelings of trust toward the seller-advisor after a third party’s dis-
closure of the seller-advisor’s conflict of interest accounted for nearly 36% 
of the change in consumer preferences.244 Moreover, consumers’ prefer-
ences for the expensive financial option were strongly, significantly, and 
positively associated with their financial choices, such that higher prefer-
ences for the more expensive option were associated with actually choosing 
the more expensive option, and vice versa.245 These strong preferences like-
ly explain a significant remainder of the participants’ decision making. 
V. IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this Part of the Article, we offer thoughts about the normative impli-
cations of our study and acknowledge the limitations of our approach and 
conclusions.246 We address potential objections to our methodology and 
discuss avenues for future research.247 Finally, we offer the concluding 
thoughts about our study results and analysis. 
A. Research and Policy Implications 
In this Article, we identify some of the contours and limitations of con-
sumers’ trust in seller-advisors. We found that consumers may enter an in-
teraction with a seller-advisor giving the seller-advisor the benefit of the 
doubt, assuming or “trusting” that the seller-advisor is knowledgeable and 
well-intentioned.248 As the stakes and significance of the transaction at issue 
increased, consumers were less likely to defer to the seller-advisor’s advice 
to choose a more expensive option.249 High stakes transactions led to more 
conservative decisions. Consumers who received advice, however, were 
more likely to choose the more expensive/riskier option than those who re-
ceived no advice.250 The fact that consumers were willing to change their 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Total effect of the difference in trust levels on the difference in participants’ preferences 
for the expensive option: B = 0.26, SE = 0.07, t(261) = 3.84, p < .001, CI [0.13, 0.40]. Effect of the 
difference in participants’ preferences (while controlling for their difference in trust levels): B = 
0.18, SE = 0.07, t(261) = 2.48, p = .014, CI [0.04, 0.33]. 
 244 Indirect effect of differences in trust levels on differences in participants’ financial prefer-
ences: B = 0.10, SE = 0.04, CI [0.03, 0.18]. 
 245 B = 0.56, SE = 0.09, Wald = 35.63, p < .001, exponential(B) = 1.76. A one-unit increase in 
participants’ trust scores was therefore associated with a 75% increase in the odds that they would 
choose the advisor’s preferred financial option (and vice versa). 
 246 See infra notes 248–291 and accompanying text. 
 247 See infra notes 282–291 and accompanying text. 
 248 See supra notes 213–215 and accompanying text. 
 249 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra notes 209–217 and accompanying text. 
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decisions and move away from the more expensive choice when the seller-
advisor’s incentives were initially concealed and then later revealed by a 
third party indicates a potential loss of trust in those situations, putting the 
consumer on guard and, therefore, less likely to defer to the seller-advisor’s 
judgment.251 
Social science literature tells us that society’s goal should not be to en-
courage trust, but rather to encourage trustworthiness.252 The focus then 
should be on what seller-advisors can do to signal trustworthiness and to 
create a structure around their interactions with consumers that earnestly, 
and in good faith, works to take into account and honor consumers’ prefer-
ences in giving advice. By taking actions that signal trustworthiness, a sell-
er-advisor may actually become trustworthy. Of course, all kinds of signals 
can be faked, and seller-advisors could lull consumers into inappropriately 
trusting them without too much effort. The law may play a role in verifying 
signals of trustworthiness and perhaps in punishing false signals. The law 
may also effectively incentivize reliable signals. It must take care, though, 
not to mandate signals that could prove false. Requiring everyone to “look” 
trustworthy, when not everyone is, would be a great detriment to consumer 
trust and well-being. Consumers need help identifying competent, benevo-
lent seller-advisors who have integrity. 
The law may be able to assist by signaling trustworthy seller-advisors, 
but must be very careful not to overburden communications between con-
sumers and seller-advisors or to legitimize false signals sent by untrustwor-
thy seller-advisors. The law’s role in promoting safe, trusting relationships 
between consumers and seller-advisors is to help consumers separate the 
good from the bad. As many scholars in the past have noted, the law’s abil-
ity to influence trust may be limited.253 It is most important that the law not 
impede the ability of consumers and seller-advisors to form trusting rela-
tionships or create so much noise that reliable signals are lost. Perhaps the 
law would do best to assist market mechanisms that work and to avoid im-
peding the effective communication the market has already devised. A sys-
tem that fosters communication and is still able to punish false signals may 
be able to strike the optimal balance. 
There appear to be several benefits to consumers’ decision making 
when seller-advisors disclose their personal incentives voluntarily at the 
outset of the conversation. Understanding how seller-advisors are compen-
sated and what their motivations are for the advice they give helps consum-
ers better understand the transactions or products they are considering and 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See HARDIN, supra note 39, at 23. 
 252 Id. at 1. 
 253 See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 92, at 554 (“This article concludes that trust does not pro-
vide a distinct justification for mandatory legal rules . . . .”). 
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allows them to make more informed decisions. Such disclosures would also 
serve as admissions against interest. That sort of openness is key to building 
a belief in the benevolence of, and thereby trust in, the seller-advisor.254 
Disclosure of conflicts of interest and compensation structures is a key ele-
ment of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.255 Fiduciaries may not harbor financial 
interests without disclosing them to their beneficiaries and receiving their 
approval.256 Requiring the disclosure of a seller-advisor’s interest in the 
transaction would honor the hybrid nature of the seller-advisor’s role. Mere 
disclosure would not be as onerous as the duties imposed on fiduciaries be-
cause a seller-advisor would not have to seek the consumer’s consent for 
the compensation scheme or financial interest. Simple disclosure would 
allow a consumer to understand more completely how the transaction works 
and to put the seller-advisor’s recommendations in the proper context. 
Legally mandated disclosure is fraught. Book-length disclosures for 
simple transactions effectively bury important, easy to understand terms, 
and are therefore frequently ignored.257 Legally required disclosures are 
more likely to be rushed over and treated as an onerous obligation, rather 
than as a simple, important part of explaining a transaction to a consumer.258 
Further, disclosures made to fulfill legal obligations may not help to build 
trust because they do not serve as an indication of voluntary openness. Ad-
missions against interest do not build trust if they are only given under pain 
of legal liability.259 The law may not be able to force conditions amenable to 
trust by mandating disclosure. Furthermore, the law may undermine its very 
purpose if it goes too far down that path. 
There may be a way to use various carrots to induce seller-advisors to 
be more trustworthy, or to try to develop and encourage trustworthiness in 
their employees. If the law were to more openly acknowledge that seller-
advisors have special attributes that put them in a different category than 
other sellers and fiduciary duty-bound advisors, there may be a way to de-
velop a jurisprudence around their interactions with consumers. When a 
consumer is aggrieved by their relationship with a seller-advisor—for in-
stance, if a consumer received and acted upon completely inappropriate ad-
vice and was harmed—a seller-advisor may be given the benefit of the 
doubt if he clearly and simply explained his interest in the transaction to the 
consumer. Clear and effective warnings to consumers about the potential 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See supra notes 148–156 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 256 See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 87, at 1229. 
 257 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, at 8–9. 
 258 Id. 
 259 See Ribstein, supra note 92, at 577 (“Regulation thereby may increase the friction and 
attendant transaction costs that trust is supposed to reduce.”). 
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dangers of following the seller-advisor’s recommendation, or of not doing 
more independent research, may warrant more lenient treatment of seller-
advisors whose advice harms consumers.260 Finding indications of benevo-
lence and good faith may absolve the seller-advisor of responsibility for a 
decision that is revealed to be ill-advised only in hindsight. The law should 
seek ways to encourage and incentivize benevolence and commitments to 
actions that signal good faith without micromanaging the communications 
between seller-advisors and consumers. 
Ability can be signaled and disclosed more easily than benevolence.261 
Posting credentials or publicizing the credentials required to obtain a seller-
advisor position would be an obvious step for companies interested in sig-
naling the superior expertise and competence of their seller-advisors. De-
veloping a long, successful track record in an industry or geographical re-
gion can also serve that purpose. Seeking and highlighting favorable con-
sumer testimonials and reviews can also signal successful experience to 
potential consumers. Professional associations can set standards for exper-
tise and competence and require the disclosure of certain credentials. They 
can also require disclaimers by seller-advisors that express the limits of 
their knowledge and ability and point consumers to other helpful resources 
that may offer them guidance. Admissions against interest can, again, be 
useful to signal trustworthiness with regard to competence or ability.262 If a 
seller-advisor says clearly, “I can help you with x, but I can’t help with y 
because I don’t have any experience with y. Y may be better for you, but 
you would have to talk with someone else about that,” that admission may 
communicate knowledge of the topic more generally by showing an aware-
ness of y and also a comfort with what the seller-advisor knows as well as 
what the seller-advisor does not know. The doctor in our scenarios did not 
admit a lack of knowledge about other procedures or treatments and did not 
emphasize that his experience was limited to one kind of treatment. Our 
results showed that patients were willing to give doctors the benefit of the 
doubt at the outset, but were more hesitant to follow the doctors’ advice as 
the stakes of the scenario increased.263 Someone who is comfortable admit-
ting what they do not know may seem less likely to make mistakes by over-
selling the advice they give based on what they do know. Understanding the 
limits of one’s own knowledge and expertise is an important element of tru-
ly demonstrating expertise. And, of course, admitting limitations is a form 
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of openness that is likely to also increase consumers’ faith in the seller-
advisor’s benevolence.264 
The law may be able to mandate disclaimers in some instances, requir-
ing that seller-advisors honestly present the limits of their credentials and 
expertise. The typical problems with mandatory disclosure regimes would 
arise if those disclosure requirements go too far.265 Standards of care and 
licensing requirements are the usual legal responses to problems of compe-
tence. All are strategies that can be effective and help communication and 
signaling if used judiciously. Lawmakers must be cautious when thinking 
about expanding licensing requirements to new industries. Licensing re-
gimes can be expensive barriers to entry for new providers and can be diffi-
cult to implement, monitor, and comply with. Some minimal standards can 
be helpful in specialized fields, but requiring that every potential seller-
advisor pass a test and pay fees would not be the answer to consumer vul-
nerability to the advice of seller-advisors. 
Professional codes of conduct or even codes of conduct internal to in-
dividual companies could help to define standards for integrity. If employ-
ees are able to internalize those codes, then the firm may be able to develop 
a reputation for having honorable employees bound to observe a code of 
conduct that the firm can easily define. One example of this would be Pro-
gressive Insurance advertising that the company will tell you if another in-
surer would offer someone in your situation better premiums.266 The com-
pany is advertising a commitment to honesty and benevolence by providing 
information to its customers that allows them to make the decision that is in 
their interests, even if those interests conflict with the interests of Progres-
sive. Another way to communicate integrity would be to treat employees 
with compassion. If a firm treats its employees well, even when it is more 
expensive to do so, consumers may assume that the company is more likely 
to apply the same standard of care to them. 267 Integrity refers to a personal 
commitment to an honorable code of conduct.268 Such a personality trait 
may be difficult for companies to inspire or guarantee, but not impossible to 
cultivate through codes of conduct, norms, clearly stated priorities and val-
ues, and careful hiring and supervision. A culture of integrity could carry 
over to seller-advisor employees and could strongly influence the ways in 
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which those seller-advisors interact with consumers. For individuals, repu-
tation is the best way to establish and signal integrity. 
The law could, theoretically, be tremendously helpful when an entire 
industry suffers a crisis and appears to lack integrity. Then, strict legal 
standards and consumer protections can coax consumers back to the indus-
try to help encourage the interactions that will allow the industry partici-
pants to rebuild trust. Over time, the law may relax those regulatory stand-
ards (though it almost never does) to avoid overburdening an industry that 
has overcome a particularly corrupt episode. 
We find a contrary example to the idea that regulatory laws can prompt 
renewed trust in an industry in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. In 
our study, we found that people were still, surprisingly to us, distrusting of 
mortgage lenders nearly ten years after the financial crisis caused by a col-
lapse of the housing market.269 Our research subjects seemed hesitant to 
defer to the advice of a mortgage lender and were very conservative in their 
decision-making about how much money to borrow for a mortgage and un-
der what circumstances.270 Many of the strict standards that the Dodd Frank 
Act imposed after the crisis were aimed at requiring more conservative 
mortgage lending.271 The regulations addressed what kinds of loans could 
be made under what circumstances.272 Perhaps tellingly, the regulations nei-
ther imposed stricter codes of conduct on mortgage lenders or brokers, both 
originators of the crisis, nor changed the nature of the relationship between 
mortgage originators and consumers, other than adding items to what are 
already voluminous mandatory disclosures.273 The regulations simply 
kicked subprime borrowers out of the market.274 The knowledge that a bor-
rower is much less likely to be given a loan, a loan that they have very little 
hope of repaying, should be comforting knowledge and a useful assurance 
to be provided by regulation. Our research subjects, however, were hesitant 
to take the risks encouraged by our mortgage lender and were reluctant to 
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be pulled into a lower probability of being able to repay their loans.275 Not 
all regulatory interference can restore or encourage trust, even in industries 
whose reputations have been decimated. 
Indeed, some argue that people will behave more honorably and act with 
more integrity in the absence of legal interventions.276 Extrinsic motivations 
such as legal penalties may result in more guarded, selfish interactions.277 The 
law can interfere with trust by putting people on guard, making them worry 
that others will take advantage of them or try to expose them to legal penal-
ties. Think of how your interaction with someone would change if, in the 
middle of a dispute, they asked you to put things in writing or told you they 
were recording the conversation or they threatened to retain a lawyer. Inter-
personal trust, particularly as it concerns integrity and benevolence, relies 
largely on notions of intrinsic motivation and a belief that others are treating 
you better than the minimum legal standard requires.278 Indeed, if someone is 
doing only what the law requires, we are not at all convinced that they are 
worthy of our trust; we only know that we cannot punish them. 
Companies may do best to stay ahead of the legal requirements. Doing 
more than the law requires and developing a reputation for treating con-
sumers and employees better than the legal standard mandates is the way to 
build trust.279 This is not to say that the law does not have a role to play in 
facilitating trusting relationships among strangers in the marketplace. Ra-
ther, the law must be dispatched thoughtfully with a deep awareness of its 
goals and limitations. Perhaps the most useful function the law can serve in 
encouraging trust is an expressive one—one that helps trustees signal their 
trustworthiness in ways trustors can see and understand. To that end, legal 
rules and standards for behavior should be clear and obvious to trustors and 
easy for trustees to follow. 
Ultimately, we found that trust in a seller-advisor explains some of a 
consumer’s decision making, but not all, or even most, of it.280 Consumers 
still keep their own counsel to some extent and harbor and honor personal 
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preferences that seller-advisors cannot fully know or understand. The more 
trustworthy seller-advisors are and the better they are at signaling their 
trustworthiness, the more likely they will be able to help consumers enter 
mutually beneficial transactions on appropriate terms. Trustworthy seller-
advisors can be a valuable resource to uninformed, unsophisticated con-
sumers.281 The law may be able to help trustworthy seller-advisors send the 
right signals and to help consumers correctly interpret those signals. 
B. Objections and Future Directions 
The study reported in this Article is the first to empirically explore the 
relationship between consumers and seller-advisors, whom the law allows 
to provide advice to consumers without owing a fiduciary duty. This study 
challenges the traditional view of law and policymakers in this area—that 
consumers who deal with seller-advisors subscribe to a theory of caveat 
emptor, such that protections from opportunistic seller-advisors are unnec-
essary.282 Our findings suggest that consumers are influenced by the rec-
ommendations of seller-advisors across a wide, representative set of com-
monplace financial transactions, with stakes large and small.283 Moreover, 
our results suggest that the influence that seller-advisors exert over consum-
ers may stem from a mistaken belief on the part of consumers that these 
types of advisors are looking out for their financial well-being. 
The use of controlled laboratory experiments to inform policy is a bur-
geoning but relatively new development in the law.284 Although experi-
mental data has informed policy debates on a range of criminal law and ev-
identiary issues—such as eyewitness testimony, the hearsay rule, and the 
interrogation of suspects—it has so far played less of a role in informing 
policy in the realm of business law.285 It is, of course, important not to over-
state the implications of any single empirical study, including experimental 
ones.286 But it is also important to situate any empirical study within the 
literature on which the study was based, so that lawmakers can draw appro-
priate, measured conclusions from the study’s findings. 
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With that caveat in mind, controlled experiments hold many ad-
vantages to non-experimental, empirical studies. Laboratory experiments 
have the advantage of high internal validity because of the greater control 
that experimenters can exhibit with respect to the variables under investiga-
tion.287 This is because in a laboratory experiment, every aspect of the study 
is kept uniform except the aspects of the study that the experimenter manip-
ulates. This allows researchers to make even stronger causal conclusions—
that a certain manipulation in fact caused the outcome—than researchers 
who engage in non-experimental work and use statistical controls instead.288 
Empirical validity, however, is often a tradeoff between competing in-
terests. Empirical methods have heightened internal validity but are often 
weaker with respect to external, or ecological, validity.289 Simply stated, it 
is always an open question whether the behavior that is exhibited in the rel-
atively artificial confines of the laboratory experiment, where the variable 
of interest is isolated, will also be exhibited in the noisy world outside the 
laboratory.290 
It is, of course, important to take this critique seriously, and carefully 
evaluate experimental research with an eye toward external validity when 
evaluating legal policy. There are, however, at least two responses to con-
sider. As an initial matter, many laboratory experiments are replicable in the 
“real world,” particularly studies that examine people’s attitudes toward 
legal rules or scenarios.291 Second, as long as the experiment is placed in 
the scientific context in which the experiment was conducted, such as 
against the literature that led to the experiment in this first place, empirical 
data—even imperfect data—will often be preferable to making policy de-
terminations, particularly those that make assumptions about consumer be-
havior, in the absence of any such data. This may seem an obvious state-
ment, but one to which rule-makers and policymakers should give careful 
attention. 
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CONCLUSION 
Consumers often seek advice from those selling products. They give 
seller-advisors the benefit of the doubt that the advice seller-advisors pro-
vide, at least to some extent, will be designed to promote the best interests 
of the consumer. Our study presents evidence of that baseline trust and 
shows that varying degrees of trust in seller-advisors can explain consumer 
choices. Our study found that seller-advisors are able to effectively encour-
age consumers to make more expensive choices and that there is some de-
gree of backlash when consumers are informed of a seller-advisor’s incen-
tives after they have made their choice. That backlash seems to indicate a 
kind of resentment that an adverse incentive was intentionally concealed 
from the consumer. 
The law largely ignores the trust consumers place in seller-advisors 
when seeking their advice. Fraud liability provides a remedy for lies, but 
fiduciary duties do not apply to sellers who only incidentally give advice. 
Still, consumers may trust a seller-advisor’s advice as much as they would 
trust the advice of a fiduciary advisor. Lawmakers should not be too quick 
to design legal remedies to fill that gap. They should not expand fiduciary 
obligations to any instance of a person asking advice of another. Rather, we 
should consider the trust that underlies consumer advice-seeking and en-
deavor to find ways to help trustworthy seller-advisors signal their trustwor-
thiness. Similarly, we should aim to expose the untrustworthy, making the 
variations between the different kinds of advisors more apparent to con-
sumers who may need help making purchasing decisions. Too much regula-
tion in matters of trust can be just as harmful as too little. The law cannot 
“make” anyone trustworthy; it can only help interested parties signal the 
trustworthiness that they have already developed. 
